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Important legislative and judicial measures taken in recent
years to extend greater warranty protection to consumers gen-
erally have not reached into markets for services.' Agencies that
process consumer complaints frequently find that certain ser-
vice markets, particularly auto repairs and home improve-
1 For a discussion of the current state of the law, see notes 79-98 infra & accom-
panying text.
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ments, 2 account for a disproportionate share of customer dis-
satisfaction. Nevertheless, aggrieved service consumers usually
cannot avail themselves of the theories of recovery commonly
available to consumers of goods: implied warranty and strict
liability in tort. The only "implied guarantee"--that is, an ex-
ternally imposed promise from seller to buyer-widely given to
dissatisfied consumers of services is that recovery of damages
will follow a showing that the service provider negligently per-
formed his tasks.' The complexity and importance of many ser-
vices suggest a need for greater consumer protection, but the
courts repeatedly have chosen to forego opportunities to depart
from the traditional negligence rule for services. 4
In order to assess the logic of applying different legal stan-
dards of implied guarantees to sellers of goods and sellers of
services, this Comment will develop a description or model of
what economists refer to as "information-impacted markets."
These are markets in which two parties bargain about a pro-
posed transaction, but with one party possessing important in-
formation that cannot be transferred costlessly to the other.5
The model of this type of market, based on a series of simplify-
ing assumptions concerning the crucial elements that influence
consumers' choicemaking and businesses' production and mar-
keting behavior, will incorporate key features that distinguish
service markets from goods markets. So developed, the model
will be used to predict outcomes, both with and without the im-
position of legally implied guarantees, in various types of in-
formation-impacted service markets. Employing these predic-
tions of the likely market impact of alternative legal rules along
with important noneconomic considerations, the Comment
2 See S. MARGOLIUS, THE INNOCENT CONSUMER VS. THE EXPLOITERS 155-64, 176
(1976). See generally Hearings on S.R. 233 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1969); Hearings on S.R. 40
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1969); Hearings on S.R. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 1st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 (1970); Hearings
on S.R. 334 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 (1970); Hearings on S.R. 40 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 5 & 6
(1971) (appendices).
3 The principal comparison in this regard is between implied guarantees of the
negligence type and those reflecting an implied warranty. Compare notes 56-57 infra &
accompanying text with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, -315.
a See notes 79-98 infra & accompanying text.
50. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLI-
CATIONS 31 (1975). See generally Spence, An Economist's View of Information, 9 ANN. REV.
INFO. Sci. & TECH. 57-78 (1974).
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then will evaluate the current discrepancy between the stan-
dards applied to providers of goods and providers of services,
consider the extent to which even the best chosen legal guar-
antee can protect consumers in information-impacted situa-
tions, and recommend a process by which courts can decide
future cases requiring them to choose an appropriate rule for
a particular service market. Finally, the proposed considerations
will be related to the facts and reasoning in three prominent
cases involving the sale of services-Gagne v. Bertran,6 Broyles v.
Brown Engineering Co. ,7 and Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc. 
8
I. A BASIC MODEL OF INFORMATION-IMPACTED MARKETS
A. Elements in Consumer Product Assessment
Hypotheses concerning four major input sources into con-
sumers' comparative judgments of product quality provide a
foundation for building a model of information-impacted mar-
kets.9 The most obvious element in a consumer's assessment of
product quality is information gleaned by "inspection" of the
product itself. If the product is not particularly complicated and
many different brands are available for easy and inexpensive
examination, then this component may be quite important in
the consumer's overall quality judgment. Students of consumer
behavior, however, have found that assessments of quality of-
ten hinge not on detailed inspection, but on readily observable
product features, which this Comment will call "cues," even if
these features actually have only a very loose relationship to
6 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963) (per curiam).
8 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
9 Because detailed individual notes would not conveniently or accurately reflect the
real background for the model presented here, the seminal works of economic research
inspiring it should be identified at the outset. The crucial constituent elements are the
concepts of comparative institutional modes and transaction costs, see 0. WILLIAMSON,
supra note 5, the economic and legal analysis of liability rules, see, e.g., G. CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970), the economic role of information, see, e.g., Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961), the relationship between quality
and information, see Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Qualitativ Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 488 (1970), the consumer as information seeker, see, e.g.,
Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. EcoN. 311 (1970), and the
economics of insurance, see, e.g., K. ARROW, Insurance, Rzsk and Resource Allocation in
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 134 (1971). In addition, an effort has been
made to draw on the vast quantity of empirical research into consumer behavior done
by market researchers, a source outside the normal stream of economic literature. Cita-
tions are given where appropriate. The reader who is familiar with positions taken in
much of the economics literature mentioned above will want to notice the extent to
which they and the conclusions presented here differ, especially with respect to the
ability of the competitive market to alleviate information related problems.
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true quality.10 For example, early studies revealed that shop-
pers' estimates of the durability of nylons varied with the scent
of the stockings" and that consumers resisted buying mixers
that ran too quietly because noise was considered a crucial in-
dicator of power.' 2 Market researchers currently believe that
the most important cues are brand name and price.' 3 Con-
sumers have also been found to base their product assessments
on "experience," both their own and that of friends with whom
they consult.' 4 Past experiences may be a particularly valuable
source of information if the product is purchased frequently so
that many experiences can accumulate, or if the consumer has
friends with particular expertise who can interpret complicated
experiences meaningfully. Finally, consumers invariably have
some general "hunch" about the quality to be expected from
any given product, regardless of the particular brand purchased
or the lack of any brand-specific knowledge. This general ex-
pectation may well be crucial in the initial decision to buy the
product, a judgment often made prior to and in isolation from
the final choice of a specific supplier's merchandise.
To a significant extent, the anticipated effect of informa-
tion impactedness on any particular market depends on the rel-
ative importance of these four elements-inspection, cues, ex-
perience, and hunch-in the quality judgments actually made
by most consumers. A prominent feature of nearly all service
markets, indeed the key to labeling them "information im-
pacted," is that the consumer cannot conduct prepurchase in-
spections of services he is considering buying; the service does
not "exist" until it is performed for him. He can inspect the ser-
vice provider's facilities, but much of what he observes are cues
rather than direct quality-related characteristics.' 5 The import
of the other three elements varies markedly depending on the
service being purchased. Cues, for example, vary in importance
' See Cox, The Sorting Rule Model of the Consumer Product Evaluation Process, in RISK
TAKING AND INFORMATION HANDLING IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 324 (D. Cox ed. 1967).
" See Laird, How the Consumer Estimates Quality by Subconscious Sensory Impressions, 16
J. APPLIED PSYCH. 241 (1932).
" See Froman, You Get What You Want, in READINGS IN MARKETING 231 (J. H. West-
ing ed. 1953).
3 See, e.g., Monroe, Buyer's Subjective Perceptions of Price, 10 J. MARKETING RESEARCH
70 (1973).
"See, e.g., Arndt, Word of Mouth Advertising and Informal Communication, in RISK
TAKING AND INFORMATION HANDLING IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 188 (D. Cox ed. 1967).
"- Even supposedly noncommercialized premises may stimulate substantial cue re-
sponses, such as, for example, the decor of an attorney's office or the locale and
"status" of the building in which it is located. Other premises, including some beauty
parlors, are intentionally designed to maximize positive cue responses.
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because some service providers maintain premises that are more
cue-laden than others, some services operate under professional
codes that attempt to restrict sharply cue transmission, especial-
ly via advertising, 16 and some service markets are dominated by
very small service providers who cannot utilize the type of
broadly based media campaigns that can stress and exaggerate
cue responses. Similarly, experience can be an important fac-
tor in cases, such as cleaning and moving services, in which con-
sumers can meaningfully and accurately judge the quality of
the service received after its performance. In many important
service categories, however, even such after-the-fact assess-
ments are inaccurate. Thus, when a consumer purchases repair
or restorative services on a complex durable good, such as his
car, or on his own body, he is able to determine subsequently
how his car runs or how he feels, but that may give him little in-
sight into the actual quality of the work done.'" With scant un-
derstanding of the complexities of his original problem, he is
hardpressed to evaluate whether the labor performed was ac-
tually necessary or if problems that surface later could have
been avoided had the original repairs been more skillfully ex-
ecuted. Reliance on one's own and others' past experiences is
more difficult if the service is infrequently purchased, such as
home improvements, or if the sellers rapidly appear and dis-
appear in the market, such as various seasonal services. If in-
spection, cues, and experierse are all inoperative in the market,
an uninformed and unfocused hunch is all the basis for choice
left the consumer, and its importance grows accordingly.
B. Conditions and Motivations of Service Production
Several key features of service markets from the view-
point of producers are also incorporated into this model. First,
most services are produced on demand after a deal has been
struck with an individual customer, rather than being mass-
produced prior to a firm agreement of sale with the ultimate
consumer. Second, many complicated services, such as medical
care and investment advice, are characterized by a substantial
amount of production uncertainty in the sense that even the
best efforts of the most skilled practitioner may not have a high
probability of producing the result sought by the purchaser.' 8
"
6
See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2, EC 2-9 to -11
(1970).
"7 See, e.g., Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.
LAW & ECON. 67, 69 (1973).
8 Of course, there will be tremendous variation in the degree of uncertainty pre-
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It is reasonable to assume, however, that the service provider
has some measure of control over this uncertainty in that he
has a range of techniques available to him in performing the
service, some of which involve more time and care than others
and therefore have a somewhat greater probability of achieving
satisfactory results. For example, law firms cannot be sure that
taking certain steps will lead to a favorable outcome in complex
litigation, but they nonetheless recognize that the probability
of a favorable verdict varies with the attorneys assigned to the
case and the size of their outside workloads, to identify just two
elements. 19 Third, although the Comment later examines the
question of possible differences between services based on the
extent to which socialization processes, professional ethical
codes, and similar forces may engender a substantially different
type of motivation,20 the model assumes initially that service
providers are basically profit oriented. Finally, given that qual-
ity partly measures the probability of a satisfactory result but
that cost-free quality changes are no longer possible,2' the
framework accepts the proposition that any attempts to improve
quality must involve necessarily a more careful and hence ex-
pensive process for the service provider.
Insofar as quality improvements increase costs and qual-
ity reductions lower costs, given the assumptions made to this
point, predictions of market outcomes depend essentially on
the revenue consequences of different levels of output quality
to service providers. Since prepurchase product inspections are
not possible, consumers appear at a service provider's door be-
cause of the cues they have observed, their own and their
friends' experiences with the service provider's past quality,
and their hunches about the product. Current improvements
vailing in the production of different services and even in the completion of different
specific activities within one service. Thus, open heart surgery presumably has a more
dispersed (uncertain) distribution of outcomes for any given level of effort than does
setting a broken arm.
'" The choice of techniques, as this example is intended to indicate, should often be
assessed from a management perspective, as well as that of the individual service pro-
vider. The management viewpoint broadens substantially the choices available and is
consistent with the focus on choice, as exercised by the one who can profit from it.
Thus, although in some situations it may appear as though the individuals involved
simply "do their job" with no conscious selection or variation of methods, management
does exercise a choice of techniques in the work assignment sense, as shown in the law
firm example, and, most importandy, in determining the number and caliber of per-
sonnel initially hired.
20 For a discussion of the results of replacing the strict profit-oriented assumption
with professional ideals and a desire to serve, see text accompanying notes 133-38 infra.
21 The assumption is that such changes are "no longer" possible because the service
providers have already organized their work processes to take advantage of any cost
savings and efficiencies that could be realized.
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in service quality cannot measurably increase revenues imme-
diately because these improvements do not register instan-
taneously in the quality-comparison process of consumers.
For the time being, few realize that the producer has upgraded
his service; conversely, no one knows if he cheapens his work.
This process would appear to create a strong incentive to cut
quality and capitalize on the consumer's inability to predict such
changes in advance. Obviously, however, because consumers
have memories and share experiences with one another, the
service providers' optimal production strategy cannot be de-
rived in such a simplistic fashion. In order to tell if quality
changes will be profitable, producers are forced to make cur-
rent decisions about the quality of service to offer based on the
impact of such decisions on future revenues.2 2
Before proceeding with an attempt to predict and cate-
gorize different market outcomes, it should be noted that the
baseline for comparison is the combination of prices and qual-
ities that would be offered to consumers if the market were not
characterized by information impactedness. If information
were fully, freely, and equally available to all buyers and sellers,
then one would expect to observe a collection of goods of vary-
ing prices and qualities being sold, reflecting the true prefer-
ences of consumers and the actual costs of sellers. Two impor-
tant types of deviations from this ideal-designated in this
Comment "opportunism" and "deterioration"--should be dis-
tinguished. Opportunism occurs when sellers are able to peddle
their wares at a higher price than would be the case in a market
of fully informed buyers; the sellers are opportunistically taking
advantage of their inside information about the product's true
characteristics.2 3 Deterioration occurs when the overall con-
glomeration of services offered has on the average a distinctly
lower quality than one would expect under more fully informed
conditions.
24
C. Categorizing Information-Impacted Markets
Accurate prepurchase inspection input into the consumer's
quality assessments typically is unavailable in four essentially
22 Formally, the producer will compare the present cost or saving caused by a tech-
nique adjustment with the increase or decrease in the present value of the expected
future stream of revenues. A one-time change in output quality will affect his revenues
for many time periods to come.
23 See, e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 26; Scitovsky, Ignorance as a Source of
Oligopoly Power, 40 AM. EcoN. REv. 48 (1950).
24 For an excellent discussion of the deterioration process in markets characterized
by consumer inability to assess quality, see Akerlof, supra note 9.
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different types of information-impacted markets. In the first
situation, service providers find that the revenue consequences
of quality changes are almost as rapid and substantial as in fully
informed markets. The necessary conditions for this outcome
are that the consumers of the service make accurate assessments
after performance, buy the service with some significant fre-
quency, share useful insights with others, face a stable group of
sellers, and possess positive hunches about this service market
in general. In this type of market, herein referred to as a "rich
experiences" market, quality changes are quickly perceived by
purchasers, these insights are soon transmitted to others who
are willing to act on them because of their low-risk perception
of the market as a whole, and the net results are felt swiftly by
sellers who depend on repeat customers for their frequently
needed services. Thus the consumer's initial inability to assess
service quality by prepurchase inspection leads to very little
expected deviation from the price-quality combinations that
would obtain under full information.
In the second type of information-impacted market, al-
though consumers can make accurate quality assessments after
purchase, several obstacles may prevent them from accumulat-
ing the storehouse of experiences that makes the "rich expe-
riences" market approximate closely the fully informed ideal.
If, for example, the service is purchased only rarely, is so per-
sonalized that other opinions are not very informative,25 is sold
by sellers who come and go with great rapidity, or generally has
such a dubious quality reputation that experimenting is viewed
by consumers as being very risky,26 then the link for the service
provider between today's quality and tomorrow's revenue is
greatly weakened. Because consumer reaction to quality changes
is less marked than in the "rich experiences" market, service
providers in these "limited experiences" markets find it signif-
icantly more profitable to cut quality (less loss of customers) and
less profitable to increase quality (less gain of customers) than
in a fully informed market. This change leads to some overall
25 The usefulness of others' opinions varies dramatically across products, from
those items such as gifts, dinner parties, and certain clothes, in which personal'satisfac-
tion may largely depend on the impression the product makes on other people, to very
personal services, such as those involving confidential advice seeking and individual
tastes in food and travel, in which one may find only his own assessments meaningful.
26 Numerous market researchers have found that consumer perception that a mar-
ketplace is risky tends to discourage sampling of different brands and encourage repeat
buying. See, e.g., Cunningham, Perceived Risk and Brand Loyalty, in RISK TAKING AND
INFORMATION HANDLING IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 507 (D. Cox ed. 1967); cf. Roselius,
Consumer Rankings of Risk Reduction Methods, 35 J. MARKETING, Jan. 1971, at 56.
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quality cutting (deterioration) along with many successful ef-
forts to disguise these cuts from individual consumers and main-
tain prequality-decline prices (opportunism).
More severe consumer problems develop in markets in
which quality cannot be assessed adequately even after purchase
and "use." The consumer's inability to make accurate judg-
ments, however, does not prevent him from arriving at some
sort of sweeping conclusion about whether a particular seller
performs "good work" for the price he charges. Because the
complexity of the situation and his limited understanding pre-
vent him from gaining meaningful information about the rele-
vant quality traits of the service, the consumer utilizes his reac-
tion to revise his response to various observed cues, particularly
the seller's name. This extensive use of cues, especially brand
names, creates a special type of link for service providers be-
tween today's quality and tomorrow's revenue in these "cue-
reliant" markets. If a service provider wishes to instill a favorable
cue response-to gain a "good name"--then he must send his
customers home well satisfied with what they received. Thus an
underlying set of positive experiences is necessary to create and
maintain the desired customer loyalty vital to profits in "cue-
reliant" markets. Once a significantly favorable reaction to the
brand name and other cues has been created, loyal customers
consider the product superior to others on the market and are
willing to pay a higher price than the true quality might warrant,
at least so long as their cue responses are reinforced by general
impressions of quality service.17 Accordingly, one may conclude
that "cue-reliant" markets are characterized by substantial op-
portunism, but not much deterioration.
Finally, in the most severe circumstances, the market con-
stitutes an amalgam of these last two examples. Consumers are
unable to make accurate judgments about past quality and also
have a very weak set of cue responses. This may occur either
because cues have been suppressed or limited by seller regula-
tions or business practices, or because circumstances analogous
to those found in "limited experiences" markets preclude con-
sumers from gaining a sufficiently broad set of cue responses to
enable them to make even superficial distinctions among most
27 For commentary on how advertising increases reliance on name brands and
creates a willingness to pay higher prices, see S. MARGOLIuS, supra note 2, at 15-16. But
see Nelson, The Economic Consequences of Advertising, 48J. Bus. 213-17 (1975). Notice that
Margolius, a staunch consumer advocate, criticizes these nationally advertised brands
for being overpriced, not for reflecting poor quality. This comports with the proffered
analysis that cue-reliant markets are characterized primarily by opportunism.
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sellers. In these "blind" markets, the combination of the con-
sumers' inability to perceive differences and their limited
awareness of alternatives beyond those personally sampled on
an infrequent basis drastically weakens the link for service pro-
viders between today's quality and tomorrow's revenue. Service
providers have virtually no incentive to build their reputations
as high-quality sellers, and they quickly determine that it is more
profitable gradually to cheapen their services. To the extent
prices can be maintained for a time, substantial opportunism
exists, but the primary result of the situation is that "blind" mar-
kets exhibit extreme deterioration. If as time passes the lower
quality further reduces consumers' general hunches about the
value of this service, consumers may seek substitutes for the
service,2 8 and the deterioration process may thus reduce sig-
nificantly the size of the market as well as the quality of what is
sold.2
9
D. Obstacles to Voluntary Insurance
Thus, three of the information-impacted service markets
-"limited experience," "cue reliant," and "blind"--are likely
to pose substantial opportunism and deterioration problems for
consumers. As a result, one might want to demand immediately
an implied guarantee rule that would force service providers to
compensate consumers who purchase substandard quality ser-
vices in any of these difficult circumstances. Before recom-
mending any legal interference with these admittedly infor-
mation-impacted transactions, however, one must recognize
that the parties themselves are perfectly free to adopt any num-
ber of strategies that may alter some of the conditions and pre-
dictions suggested by the proposed market models. Above all,
service suppliers could voluntarily offer to insure or guarantee
their work if they believe that such an approach would attract
consumers concerned about the many uncertainties they face
in selecting a reliable service person. Indeed, one might wonder
28 There may be far more choices of this type than one at first glance imagines
because of various "no-service" possibilities, for example, feeling poorly and letting na-
ture take its course instead of seeing a doctor or prematurely trading in a car to avoid
frequent reliance on the auto repair market. Similarly, an ABA survey suggegts that one
of the primary reasons that average Americans do not seek legal advice when problems
occur is fear that they will not be able to find a lawyer competent to deal with their
particular problem. See Dennenberg, To Play Game of Life, You Must Know the Law,
Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1976, § 6, at 2, col. 4.
29 For an analogous model relating consumer inability to perceive quality differ-
ences to quality decline and ultimately to the discouragement of those who could
otherwise be satisfied customers, see Akerlof, supra note 9.
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why such guarantees do not emerge naturally in free markets
if consumers truly desire them. To answer this question, it is
necessary to analyze carefully how such voluntary insurance
would operate in the types of markets discussed.
If a service supplier enacts a "performance guaranteed"
policy, whereby he promises to redo, free of charge, any ser-
vices falling below a certain quality level, he would have to raise
his price somewhat to cover the cost of redoing initially unsuc-
cessful services.30 Consumers who prefer to avoid the risk of
"getting stuck" with bad services by paying this price increment
would patronize his business. He could not exploit the con-
sumer's desire to avoid risk, however, because another service
provider could follow with a similar guarantee at a lower price.
Thus, if the first guaranteed policy attracts enough risk averse
consumers to push the price of insured services up by $100 per
week while the cost of honoring the guarantee is only $50 per
week, then other producers would shift into the insured market
and underbid the original policy innovator. Eventually, enough
producers should shift into the insured portion of the market
so that no special profits would be earned by those offering
guarantees, and the benefits of these guarantees would fall to
the risk averse consumers.
The decision to offer insurance voluntarily has another
desirable result: those suppliers who offer guarantees would
bear initially the cost of unsatisfactory services, instead of letting
it fall on their unlucky customers. 31 These suppliers would
therefore be motivated to improve the quality of their services
at least as long as the cost of extra care and effort is less than the
amount saved by providing fewer free replacements. They
would not necessarily make their services "as carefully as pos-
sible," but rather as carefully as efficiency allowed. According-
ly, if an upgrading of technique entails costs far exceeding the
benefits to the service provider as measured by the reduction in
the expense of free reservicings, then even suppliers who insure
their output would not be motivated to make such quality im-
30 He could also offer to pay for any damages caused by the unsatisfactory service,
although that would, of course, necessitate an even greater price increase. The ensuing
analysis is stated solely in replacement cost terms, but the inclusion of consequential
damages would only alter the size, and not the direction, of the forces subsequently
discussed.
"' Obviously, the seller eventually will try to pass this cost on to the consumer. See
text accompanying note 30 supra. That passing on, however, presents its own market
problems, which are addressed subsequently in this section. See text accompanying notes
31-33 infra.
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provements. Nonetheless, the model suggests that voluntary
insurance should dampen to some extent the tendency to qual-
ity deterioration in these markets.
Unfortunately, several major obstacles prevent the volun-
tarily insured portion of the market from operating as well as
the foregoing would indicate. The enforcement of guarantees
is a costly process for both consumers and sellers. Because of the
transaction costs incurred in asserting his rights under the guar-
antee, the consumer cannot consider the offer to redo inade-
quate service as truly equivalent to the full benefits of an ade-
quate initial service. He must take such steps as complaining,
returning himself and perhaps some repairable durable good
to the service supplier's location, or, at the very least, doing
without the desired service for a time-all of which lower the
value of the guarantee. Similarly, in many cases there may be
substantial transaction costs in determining whether the service
in question meets the standard promised by the guarantee. To
compensate for this cost, a burden that formally must be borne
by the service supplier 32 if he adopts a guarantee policy, the
seller must charge more than simply the amount needed to
cover the replacements he would have to make. This additional
price increment, combined with the consumer's concern about
the costs that he must bear directly to assert his guarantee
rights, would definitely reduce the voluntarily insured portion
of the market.
The transaction cost of determining whether the service
provided met the promised standard raises another important
problem that has not been explicitly discussed. Sellers could
reduce this cost almost to zero if they decided to guarantee "full
satisfaction," to accept the consumer at his word and automat-
ically provide refunds or reservicing on demand. Such an ap-
proach, however, would magnify the two problems classically
present in insurance-adverse selection and moral hazard 33 _
2 To be able to make these determinations, the seller may need to pay the costs of
employing a complaint department, traveling adjusters and inspectors, and other per-
sonnel.
11 "Moral hazard" arises when the insurance scheme necessarily reduces a person's
incentives to guard against the undesired result. For example, if defense contractors are
insured by government agents against increases in their costs over the amount specified
in the original contract, then they may not exert a maximum effort to prevent such cost
increases. "Adverse selection" occurs when the population knows more about its essen-
tial risk characteristics than the insurer, so that mainly high risk types buy insurance. If
the life insurance companies dropped their age restrictions and medical examination
requirements, they could expect a flood of people with terminal illnesses at their doors
to purchase additional life insurance. See K. ARROW, supra note 9, at 142-43; Akerlof,
supra note 9, at 492-94.
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by increasing greatly the extent to which the consumer's be-
havior can affect his ultimate satisfaction with the service he
receives. For example, although maintenance work on a durable
good may be unsatisfactory because of its short useful life, sure-
ly the consumer's manner of using the good is itself a major ele-
ment in determining how long he can wait until he again needs
maintenance service. Guarantees containing limitations, such as
on manner of use or time during which they will be honored,
are basically efforts to reduce the consumer's influence on the
warranteed portion of the flow of services that results from the
service provider's own work.
In short, full satisfaction offers introduce the moral haz-
ard problem by diminishing the consumer's incentive to take
appropriate steps to increase his satisfaction with the service
received. To a lesser extent, such offers also introduce the ad-
verse selection problem by encouraging those very customers
who will exploit such guarantees, thus making them losing prop-
ositions for the sellers, to take advantage of insured services.
Appliance manufacturers have indicated that this very combina-
tion of problems deters them from voluntarily offering more
substantial warranties, particularly because they perceive such
a significant range of potential customer abuse of their prod-
uct.34 Although this particular problem may be less substantial
in many service markets, the general moral hazard danger,
combined with the transaction costs discussed above, may re-
duce decisively the scope of the insured portion of the total mar-
ket. Thus, the voluntarily insured portion of the market may
often be quite small, perhaps even nonexistent, despite con-
sumers' real desire to avoid the uncertainties of uninformed
buying and their willingness to pay a premium for some type
of guarantee.
E. Providing Information as a Competitive Strategy
In addition to innovating by offering voluntary guaran-
tees, sellers and buyers have other possible marketing strate-
gies open to them, particularly a frontal attack on the problem
of information impactedness. Some of the leading economists
who have analyzed information problems have concluded that
the natural motivations of producers impel them to provide
freely a great deal of information to consumers, 35 thereby dis-
3 'See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON APPLIANCE
WARRANTIES AND SERVICE 80-82 (1969).
11 See, e.g., R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC 3-4 (1973); Stigler,
supra note 9, at 223-24.
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:365
sipating the undesirable effects of information impactedness.
For example, Stigler asserts, "From the manufacturer's
viewpoint, uncertainty concerning his price is clearly disadvan-
tageous. The cost of search is a cost of purchase, and consump-
tion will therefore be smaller ....36 Thus, the more consumers
must spend on finding out what and from whom to buy, the
less they will spend on actually buying it. Similarly, Posner con-
cludes that sellers will pay the cost of spreading information
so long as the amount they spend is less than the aggregate
amount their information dissemination saves consumers in
search costs, because by doing so the total cost of the product
declines, and, consequently, consumers will purchase more of
it.37 This line of reasoning suggests that the initial information
impactedness characterizing a market would soon be eliminated
by producers hurrying to tell consumers about their services.
If there is information of positive value to potential customers,
then presumably those sellers who lag behind in the disclosure
race would suffer major competitive disadvantages. Consumers
would choose primarily from among familiar brands, rather
than investing from scratch in basic and costly information
about unknown sources of supply that could only be presumed
to be somewhere in the market.
The foregoing analysis, however, implicitly assumes that
all of the information provided by sellers will be accurate and
helpful. In the type of service markets being analyzed here, in
which even the service providers can make only probability
statements concerning their output and in which information
about real quality attributes is very limited, serious doubt exists
that producer claims can be verified effectively by consumers.
Further, although suppliers may be interested in freely offering
precise "access facts" such as location, hours, and available ser-
vices, they would be motivated to make more nebulous state-
ments concerning the underlying quality features that are hid-
den from consumers in information-impacted situations.
38
Sellers would find it very awkward to advertise their service
11 Stigler, supra note 9, at 223.
37 R. POSNER, supra note 35, at 4.
38 This distinction between types of information explains the difference between
the conclusion here and that put forward by Stigler, supra note 9, at 224. His analysis
might well be an accurate model of the incentives to provide "access facts," but such a
prediction surely cannot lead to the expectation that the essential information-related
problems of consumers would be eliminated by such data, because buyers would still
lack basic quality information. Stigler does, however, acknowledge that he purposely
avoided attempting to analyze the search for quality information. Id.
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as "only 6% defective."39 It is likely, therefore, that the infor-
mation imparted would be much the same, and about as help-
ful, as that which current advertising provides. Even if precise
quality-related statements are made, the consumer still faces a
task of near statistical impossibility in determining which pro-
ducers have made valid claims of a meaningfully superior ser-
vice. The problem is tremendously compounded if the con-
sumer cannot make accurate postpurchase quality assessments,
because that inability eliminates his best reference point for test-
ing producer claims. Recognition of these considerations has
led several commentators, including some who believe that the
marketplace normally can discipline those who make promises
and do not keep them, to agree that if consumers cannot judge
accurately the effectiveness of different producers, even in the
long run, then sellers are likely to make exaggerated claims con-
cerning the qualities of what they are selling.40
Therefore, although the motive to supply information to
reduce consumers' search costs does exist, the validity and com-
pleteness of the information that will be provided are suspect,
at least with regard to information that goes beyond "access
facts." This analysis suggests that there is no reason to believe
that information provided by sellers will alleviate fundamental
information impactedness conditions or affect the validity of
the market predictions advanced herein.4'
F. Repeat Buying as a Consumer Strategy
The main consumer strategy that could alleviate some of
the problems of information impactedness is simply spending
the time and effort required to become more informed. There
are substantial costs involved, of course, in learning more about
either what the market has to offer-who the sellers are, how
good they are, how much they charge, and so on-or the in-
trinsic qualities of a particular service. Unfortunately, the same
underlying conditions initially creating information-impacted
markets also tend to discourage consumers from trying to learn
more by prepurchase investigations or by sampling differ-
3gCf. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 1017 (1966) ("[C]urrent marketing and advertising
philosophy is not calculated to operate in a posture of lucid warnings and disclaimers.").
4' See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 35, at 4-5; Darby & Karni, supra note 17, at 68-72.
But see Nelson, supra note 27.
41 For a very strong statement of the position that, on balance, information sup-
plied by producers aggravates consumer information problems and multiplies op-
portunism, see S. MARGOLIUS, supra note 2, at 12-24.
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ent brands, behaviors referred to in this Comment as "search"
and "experience sampling," respectively. 42 For example, even
though search greatly enhances the consumer's information in
markets for important purchases such as appliances and hous-
ing, the crucial problems that consumers confront in gaining
valid information from prepurchase inspections practically
eliminate the incentive to engage in search behavior in service
markets. The service consumer's principal motivation for search
comes from his responsiveness to inspection-related cues; his
responses may afford him a sense that he has truly sharpened
his quality assessment by visiting the service provider's prem-
ises. 43 Clearly, traditional prepurchase "shopping around" can-
not be expected to play any significant role in reducing the type
of information deficiencies that are the focus here.
Predicting consumers' experience sampling behavior re-
quires reference to the four different categories of information
impacted markets described above. The extent to which such
behavior was and could be utilized was implicitly a vital criterion
in making the distinctions between market types.4 4 The con-
sumer in limited experiences circumstances has very little in-
formation about products that he has not personally sampled.
He might, therefore, seem likely to engage in extensive expe-
rience sampling as his only real avenue to an informed choice.
If, however, his general hunch about that service market as a
whole is quite low-for example, perhaps he believes that most
auto mechanics are unreliable-then he will be deterred from
further sampling once he has located an acceptable service sup-
plier.45 Similarly, consumers reacting to brand names in cue-
reliant markets are unlikely to bear the expected cost of experi-
ence sampling once they have developed and reinforced a
stron~g positive cue response to a favorite seller. On the other
hand, consumers in rich experiences markets, those in limited
experiences markets who curtailed their experiences for rea-
sons other than pessimism, and those in cue-reliant markets
42 For the origins of this terminology, see Nelson, supra note 9, at 312. Nelson's
concepts of the relevant costs and benefits of different modes of information gathel ing
have been simplified for application to this model. See id. 313-15.
13 The incentive to search depends in part on the probability that such activity will
lead to a modification of the purchase choice that would have been made prior to such
search. Id. 313. Thus the response to cues, which often cause the consumer to alter his
purchase preference, can be jus. as great an incentive to search as are valid inspections.
a4 The two basic differences between rich experiences and limited experiences
markets, for example, are the predicted extent of experience sampling and the range of
contacts with other consumers. See notes 25-26 supra & accompanying text.
" See sources cited at note 26 supra.
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who primarily respond to cues other than name are not likely
to display the same degree of brand-loyal buying. Only in the
rich experiences market, however, does experience sampling
reduce substantially normal information impactedness prob-
lems.46
The strength of the incentives for consumers to replace
experience sampling with a pattern of brand loyal buying 47 can
be better appreciated by focusing momentarily on blind mar-
kets. Consumers in such situations can be expected to recognize
not only their own minimal ability to distinguish meaningfully
among sellers, but also that service providers possess a special
advantage because their product is produced on demand for a
particular customer. Although all television sets of a given
model made by any one manufacturer in one month or possibly
even one year are likely to have been built very similarly, the
service supplier can vary dramatically the care and intensity of
his efforts as each new customer walks through the door. The
chances for opportunism multiply fantastically when the seller
can make individual determinations about the knowledgeabil-
ity and long run expected worth of each customer, instead of
having to fix a single marketing strategy in advance.
The consumer has only one real bargaining chip in this
situation: the potential to become a valuable customer by re-
peatedly patronizing the same service supplier. 48 When the ser-
vice provider senses this possibility he can be expected to cur-
tail some of his opportunistic behavior in order to maintain the
stream of future business the customer represents. On the other
hand, consumers who emit signals indicating a low probability
of becoming a return customer-an out of state license plate, a
neglected good that shows regular maintenance is not sought-
46 For example, those in limited experiences markets who are unaware of the attri-
butes of many sellers because of low frequency of purchase may not display brand loyal
buying patterns, but they are still subjected to the deterioration and opportunism pre-
dicted to characterize such markets. The rich experiences circumstances remain the
only ones in which impactedness problems will be alleviated naturally.
47 These predictions of consumer behavior are essentially an application of a type
of organizational analysis developed in 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 20-40. William-
son discusses the frequent tendency of economic agents involved in repeat transactions
to develop organizational modes offering substantial advantages for both parties by de-
parting from true market contracting behavior. In the analysis that follows, the con-
sumers gain such advantages by practically ceasing to play the role expected of active
consumers in a market system and, in a sense, 'joining" the business firm as a regular
part of the total organization.
4' For a slightly different explanation of the development of client-type relation-
ships as a "solution" for customers in markets highly susceptible to fraud, see Darby &
Karni, supra note 17, at 80-81.
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may face significantly more exploitative seller behavior. The
desire to reduce seller opportunism, however, is only one of the
forces impelling consumers to forego experience sampling and
become steady clients of a service provider. For example, many
services involve elements of personal diagnosis or adjustments
that can be done much more efficiently by people who have pre-
viously performed the service for that customer.49 Further,
many people place a positive value on the personalized relation-
ships that can be developed over time between service provider
and consumer." Thus, with the exception of those in the favor-
able setting of rich experiences markets, most consumers are
unlikely to find manageable personal strategies to overcome in-
formation impactedness. 51 They will tend instead to search and
engage in experience sampling only until they locate a seller
whose price-quality offering is acceptable and whose regular
client they can become.
I. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL: CHOOSING THE
APPROPRIATE LEGAL RULE FOR PARTICULAR SERVICE
MARKETS-A DECISIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE COURTS
A. The Impact of Implied Guarantees
The foregoing has indicated that inherent market forces
limit severely the availability of voluntarily insured services,
preclude dissemination of a substantial quantity of reliable in-
formation concerning service quality, and induce much habitual
and uninformed buying. On balance, the self-interested strate-
gies of consumers and sellers increase the potential avenues for
49 Efficiencies may be realized in the time sense of not having to explain to a cus-
tomary service provider precisely how one's hair should be cut or what type of cleaning
work needs to be done. More importantly, however, efficiencies in terms of better per-
formance for the price may be realized because the customer cannot successfully articu-
late his needs or desires to a new service person at a first meeting as well as he can
gradually communicate them over time. Moreover, problems may exist that the service
provider is called upon to fix that can only by diagnosed accurately by someone with
long term familiarity with the object needing repair.
"' These types of personal preferences for one "style" of contracting over another
on primarily noneconomic grounds are referred to by Williamson as "atmosphere." See
0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 37. Such advantages could easily be so strong in some
service markets, especially those in which much confidential information must be con-
veyed to the service provider, that even the most knowledgeable consumers may
strongly prefer to establish client-type relationships.
51 Both aspects of the client relationship's impact on information impactedness
problems must be recognized. Consumers may understandably decide to become clients
in order to limit or check opportunism, but their desire to maintain such relationships
also exposes them to such opportunism because they have withdrawn from the market
and are no longer making any precise comparisons between sellers.
EXTENDING IMPLIED WARRANTIES
seller opportunism and reduce only minimally the quality de-
terioration identified as the potential outcomes in the "limited
experiences, '52 "cue-reliant,"53 and "blind"54 markets. With no
reasonable expectation, then, of a "natural cure" for informa-
tion impactedness-related problems, 55 the next crucial question
is the impact of various legal rules of implied guarantees on
these types of markets. The effect of such rules will vary not
only with the strictness of the rule-the extent to which it shifts
the costs of consumer dissatisfaction and injury back to sellers
and producers-but also with the manner in which the rule
operates. The key distinction in this latter regard is between
rules that determine liability by assessing the activities of the ser-
vice provider, such as a negligence rule and its required stan-
dard of care, and rules that determine liability by focusing on
the characteristics of the product or service itself, such as an
implied warranty rule and its merchantability test.
1. Combating Deterioration and Opportunism
Effort-oriented rules, such as the traditional negligence
standard, modify the reward structure of service providers. In
the absence of any legally implied guarantee, a service provider
can assess planned technique changes involving less careful
service production simply by comparing the possible loss of cus-
tomers caused by lower quality output with the savings realized
by using less expensive methods of service performance. With
an implied guarantee rule in effect, however, he must consider
the additional cost of court-imposed damage payments if dis-
satisfied customers can show that his efforts did not meet the
legal standard. His choice of techniques is not significantly af-
fected by the imposition of a liability rule until he begins to con-
sider utilizing techniques involving a level of effort near or
below the legal standard; 56 the potential imposition of damage
payments generally makes it unprofitable for service providers
to regularly select production techniques at or below the stan-
52 See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
" See text acccompanying note 27 supra.
51 See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
55But see 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 26-28, 31-33. Recall the statement at the
outset that the model developed here arrives at divergent conclusions from many of the
major sources of the concepts employed in this analysis. See note 9 supra. This conclu-
sion about the limits of the competitive mechanism is perhaps one of the most impor-
tant of such differences.
51 Producers may have difficulty knowing with certainty whether a given level of
effort is likely to be adjudged as a breach of the standard, but the motivation provided
by the rule will be operable as long as they can distinguish different techniques accord-
ing to the rough probability of incurring liability.
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dard. Thus, the introduction of an effort-oriented implied
guarantee rule provides a floor under the quality deterioration
expected in information-impacted markets. Moreover, if the
level of legally required effort is set very high, producers would
be forced either to improve the carefulness with which they
provide services or to drop out of the market entirely.
57
Outcome-oriented rules may have slightly more complex
effects on expected marketplace results. Imposition of a legal
standard for output quality may curb deterioration because ser-
vice providers would be deterred from choosing techniques
likely to produce a high percentage of services that fail to fulfill
the legally required minimum quality. In comparison to effort-
oriented rules, outcome rules may provide a firmer floor under
deterioration because the dissatisfied customer must show only
that he received a poor quality service, whereas under an effort-
oriented rule he ordinarily must demonstrate both that he was
damaged by a poor quality service and that the service provider
failed to expend the legally required effort. If the outcome rule
assumes a slightly more complicated form, such as an implied
warranty of merchantability,58 then it may also curb some op-
portunism by service providers, although offering less resis-
tance to quality deterioration. The key to these effects in a given
situation is defining merchantability with reference to the price
paid by the consumer. 59 Accordingly, if producers cut their
prices they could effectuate corresponding quality decreases
without confronting the threat of legally imposed refunds and
damages awards. Courts would, for example, be able to hold
that a customer received a merchantable ten dollar repair job
because he "got what he paid for," even if the repair work was
shoddily performed by some other standard. Similarly, at
5, The level of legally required effort does not have to be expressed in terms of a
"reasonable man" or "prevailing standards of practice." Although this discussion basi-
cally proceeds with a view toward the familiar negligence standard as the prime effort-
oriented rule, analytically the effort standard could be set higher ("all feasible cau-
tions"), or lower ("no reckless production techniques").
58 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
59 For example, a West Virgina court disposed of a situation in which a generally
knowledgeable buyer paid about half of the usual price for some coking coal and then
sought to recover for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability because the ash
content was too high, stating, "[T]he nature and scope of an implied warranty of mer-
chantability, which is a concept relating to overall quality rather than fitness for a par-
ticular purpose, are excellently outlined by consideration of the selling price." Sylvia
Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 828, 156 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1967).
The court cited an official comment in the West Virginia codification of the UCC, W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-314 (Michie 1966), Comment 7, for this proposition. Id. at 827,
156 S.E.2d at 7.
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higher prices service providers would recognize that they might
face legal liability if they marketed mediocre services; their out-
put might not constitute "merchantable top calibre" service
work. Thus, an outcome rule of the merchantability type could
limit opportunism by imposing liability on sellers for quality
deviating from reasonable consumer expectations generated by
the price, whereas an effort-oriented rule would primarily ad-
dress deterioration by focusing on the efforts expended by the
service provider.
Both effort-oriented and outcome-oriented rules, how-
ever, are more likely to be successful in curbing quality deteri-
oration than in discouraging seller opportunism. For example,
a merchantability rule that honors pricing signals is unlikely
to curtail modest forms of opportunism, such as charging slight-
ly above average prices for merely average quality. In what is
supposedly a system based on free markets, the realities of the
judicial process make the courts an inappropriate vehicle to
impose precise quality fine tuning sufficient to meet this prob-
lem.60 More fundamentally, deterioration and opportunism
pose markedly different detection problems for consumers. If
a person is troubled by deterioration in the quality of a service,
he can bring suit and allow the courts to determine whether the
service provider failed to make the requisite efforts or meet the
appropriate output standards. Much opportunism occurs, how-
ever, when people who are generally satisfied-or perhaps even
well pleased-with a service pay a premium for it that they
would not have paid in a more fully informed marketplace. Al-
though outside observers may perceive the problem, those
making the purchase may be perfectly content.61 One familiar
manifestation of such opportunism is the performance of un-
needed repair or restorative services in the course of remedying
a relatively simple malfunction.6 2 The customer departs rea-
60 The courts could calibrate a quality scale for every product and service and de-
fine a complete set of standards necessary, for example, for a merchantable $20 brake
job, $30 brake job, and $40 brake job, but such an endeavor would give the courts
almost absolute power over the terms of the bargains struck in the marketplace, a con-
cept completely inconsistent with even the most rudimentary notion of freedom of con-
tract.
6 Recall that cue-reliant consumers will come to believe that their favorite brand is
actually better and hence freely subject themselves to a substantial amount of oppor-
tunistic exploitation. See text accompanying note 27 supra. For examples that indicate
the strength of such cue-related preferences, even in the face of data showing the phys-
ical and chemical equivalence of competing brands, see S. MARGOLIUS, supra note 2, at
14-16.
12 For a model of repair markets that focuses on the problem of performing un-
needed services, see Darby & Karni, supra note 17.
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sonably content because his problem has been remedied. He
may never realize that he actually paid much more than the
problem demanded. To the extent that the lack of consumer in-
formation shields this situation from the view of those who are
"victimized," neither marketplace discipline in the form of dis-
satisfied customers taking their business elsewhere nor legal
imposition of an implied guarantee is likely to offer much relief.
2. Other Key Features of Implied Guarantees
Having recognized the impact of a proposed legal guar-
antee rule on the information impactedness-related problems
of deterioration and opportunism, other key features of implied
guarantee rules should be considered before recommending
particular rules for certain markets. A second element is the
imposition of substantial transaction costs when a consumer
who believes he has been injured asserts the rights theoretically
provided by a legally implied guarantee. The process of adjudi-
cating a violation of the legal standard and determining the con-
comitant damages involves substantial costs for the consumer,
the service provider, and society at large. If market forces alone
could police effectively producer behavior, or if some simpler
means of introducing a floor under quality deterioration or
combating seller opportunism could be found, then significant
savings could be realized on these legal transaction costs. 63 Even
more importantly, if the transaction costs the unhappy con-
sumer must bear to redress his grievance become too great, he
may decline to press his complaint, vitiating the legal rule's
power to curb deterioration and opportunism.
64
A third feature of implied guarantee rules is the potential
introduction of some very peculiar inefficiencies into both the
provision and consumption of services. The outcome standard
saddles the producer with the damages costs of practically all
defective services. The service producer therefore possesses a
strong incentive to implement technologically available and cost
efficient technique changes. The benefits of improvements in
technique may be measured in part by the reduction in service-
related damages caused by production of better quality services.
Effort-oriented legal standards, on the other hand, may per-
63 For an explanation of the potential economies involved in relying on market
forces, see McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 3,
44-45 (1970).
64 For a discussion of this problem in the context of no-fault plans as a possible
solution in the area of medical malpractice, see J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO
INJURY 29-44 (1975).
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petuate or create inefficiencies because producers are held
liable for damages only if their efforts fall short of some pre-
scribed standards. If the producer's efforts already safely ex-
ceed the legal minimum, he may disregard socially efficient im-
provements because the benefits will inure only to his customers.
Even more perversely, effort-related rules may motivate pro-
ducers to adopt more expensive techniques that produce rela-
tively small social benefits in the form of reduced damages, but
that are individually extremely profitable to the individual pro-
ducer because they lift his efforts safely above the legally estab-
lished standard. Indeed, this very response is the essence of the
current controversy over so-called "defensive medicine. '65 Some
observers believe that many doctors now prescribe tests and
treatments that they would not otherwise recommend, primar-
ily because these additional measures enhance the doctor's de-
fense against a subsequent malpractice action brought by a
dissatisfied patient. Surely the real possibility that an effort-
related standard can be the cause of producer inefficiency must
be considered in assessing the desirability of various legal rules.
The legal rule for implied guarantees can also have ef-
ficiency-related effects on consumer behavior. Despite con-
sumers' limited overall knowledge, consumers do possess some
important personal information that may have a substantial
impact on ultimate product satisfaction. 66 Moreover, certain
relevant marketplace information may aid consumers who ex-
pend the necessary time and effort to learn about prospective
purchases. 67 Given these underlying circumstances, in minimiz-
ing the occurrence of marketplace discontent care must be
taken to avoid shifting the responsibility and cost of all such dis-
satisfaction to producers or sellers. A total shift would reduce
the incentives for consumers to institute socially efficient (cost
less than benefits) actions to protect themselves. Thus retailers
who guarantee "money back if not perfectly satisfied" may re-
duce to some extent customer incentive to shop around, care-
fully examining items, or to use the product carefully to extend
its useful life. This problem is closely analogous to the moral
6'5 See id. See generally R. TITMUSS, THE GIFr RELATIONSHIP 168-69 (1971).
66 Consumers have special knowledge of their own particular needs. This may be
crucial in determining if a certain type of therapy, investment advice, or other service is
ultimately satisfactory. The costs of transferring such internalized, satisfaction-related
information may be demonstrated by the difficulties frequently encountered in giving
someone else instructions sufficient to make an acceptable purchase of many types of
goods and services.
67 See notes 42-43 supra & accompanying text.
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hazard and adverse selection problems that would operate to
reduce the feasibility of voluntary insurance by service pro-
viders. 68 Thus, incentives to inefficiency possibly generated by
particular legally implied guarantees must be considered on
both the producer and the consumer side of the transaction.
The fourth crucial general effect of legally implied guar-
antee rules is a potential reduction in marketplace choices. If
effective, implied guarantee rules would drive certain previ-
ously available choices off the market by judicially imposing
intolerably heavy damage awards. To the extent that a mer-
chantability type of outcome-oriented rule aims at opportunism
by allowing low quality to remain on the market if the price is
correspondingly low, the elimination of some opportunistic
price-quality offerings from the range of available choices ap-
pears desirable. Both types of legal standards, however, and
particularly effort-related standards, are more likely to be used
to combat deterioration by focusing on services frequently fail-
ing to produce successful results. 6 9 This use is likely to drive off
the market some high risk services previously desired by con-
sumers because of their low price or potentially enormous value
(such as difficult surgery that could save a life). If the legal stan-
dard effectively reduces quality deterioration and forces pre-
viously uninsured sellers to employ more careful techniques,
consumer welfare may be enhanced; the consequence would be
the availability of many alternatives of reasonable quality falling
between the prior extremes of a few high-quality insured ser-
vices and a plethora of uninsured services of dubious quality.
For those knowing consumers who previously preferred the
high-risk options, however, narrowing their choices would en-
tail decreased welfare.70 No general prediction can be advanced
concerning the expected result for all services, but anyone rec-
ommending particular legal rules must realize that any proposed
rule necessarily implies a social decision regarding which price-
quality-risk alternatives should remain on the market. 71 If not
selected with this concern in mind, the guarantee rule can err
in either of two directions: admitting undesirably risky options
or driving out suppliers that many people value and would keep
if given the choice.
" See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
19 See notes 60-62 supra & accompanying text.
70 See McKean, supra note 63, at 50-51.
71 Because the judicial or administrative determination concerning a particular
buyer and seller will necessarily affect the marketing decisions of all producers, any
such determination will become, in large part, a "social decision."
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Fifth, in addition to the wide range of overall market ef-
fects introduced by imposing a legal guarantee rule, it is im-
portant to consider that all such rules may not comport equally
well with societal notions of individual justice. 7 For example,
regardless of the market desirability of a particular rule, many
would characterize it unfair to hold individual service providers
liable for damages if they employed maximal skills and tech-
nology but nevertheless failed to achieve the desired results.
Others would similarly revolt at the notion that an "innocent
customer" should ever be left to bear the costs of physical in-
juries stemming from services performed for him, regardless
of the care and intentions of the service provider. Such con-
siderations are significant both because predictions of positive
market effects alone are unlikely to produce "better" legal rules
and because rules that strongly conflict with traditional social
values are unlikely to operate in practice in the intended man-
ner. 73
B. Preliminay Inquiries and Guidelines for Adjudication
The economic models and predicted effects of various
legal rules articulated in this Comment suggest the types of con-
siderations courts should employ when analyzing cases involv-
ing claims against service providers. Before applying these con-
siderations to particular cases, it would be helpful to organize
them into a series of key inquiries.
In assessing the applicability of the market models, the
first step is to respond to a set of preliminary questions: (1) In-
formation impactedness-Is the situation characterized by in-
formation impactedness? (2) Range of techniques-Do the
service providers in the market possess a range of techniques
from which to choose, with some more likely than others to pro-
duce successful results? (3) Profit maximizing-When choosing
their production and marketing strategies, are service providers
likely to take advantage of their inside information in a basically
profit-maximizing fashion? (4) Nonmarket curbs-Is there a
12 For a closely analogous discussion of combining economic goals with considera-
tions of justice, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 9, at 24-31.
71 If legal rules are enacted in the face of such conflicts, the theoretical predictions
that led to the enactments are likely to be confounded by the behavior of the real
people involved in enforcing such rules. For instance, if strict liability for doctors is
predicted to lead to substantial improvements in the quality of care, but society feels
that such liability is "not fair," then judges and juries may strain to return verdicts in
favor of doctors by expansively interpreting such concepts as assumption of risk in
order to shift responsibility back to the patients.
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lack of nonmarket forces (other than implied guarantees) that
could curb deterioration and opportunism?
These inquiries are essential to assessing the applicability
of the market models detailed above and understanding the
role that an implied guarantee can be expected to assume in a
particular service market. Although they do not dictate auto-
matically a choice of rules, affirmative responses to them will
indicate that the model's basic assumptions and predictions con-
cerning the role of implied guarantees fit the case at hand and
that these considerations can be molded into a decisional frame-
work for selecting the appropriate legal rule. A negative re-
sponse, on the other hand, will be a warning flag that the implied
guarantee will not play the normal role suggested by the model
and that the decisionmaking process needs to be modified. For
example, if a court believes that service providers in a specific
circumstance possess no realistic alternative procedures (no
range of techniques),7 4 it should recognize that a legally implied
guarantee would not alter the reward structure faced by the
service providers as they decide how to perform their tasks.
Similarly, if major external forces such as a detailed statutory
scheme of disclosure requirements (no information impacted-
ness) and output regulations (nonmarket curbs) have previously
been injected into the market to limit opportunism or deterio-
ration, the court should sense both that the implied guarantee
may not fulfill its usual function of combating information im-
pactedness problems and that deference to the statutory scheme
as an expression of legislative intent concerning the shape of
this market may be proper. Finally, as shall be stressed in the
forthcoming discussion of Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co. 75 and
74 This issue was discussed in the lower court opinions in Magrine v. Krasnica, 94
N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), affd sub nom. Magrine v.
Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), aff'd, 53
N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969) (per curiam). The county court determined that a dentist
should not be held strictly liable for a needle that broke off in his patient's jaw, stress-
ing that one of the key policies motivating strict liability is the belief that sellers are in a
better position than buyers to know about and control defects; that is, they have a
choice of techniques. Id. at 234, 227 A.2d at 542. The court found this rationale inap-
plicable to the dentist and thus refused to apply strict liability. Id. at 234-35, 227 A.2d
at 543. On the other hand, the dissenting opinion in the appellate division perceived
that some control and choice did exist, insisting: "The dentist should also know the
quality of the instrument and the reliability of his source of supply. [Applying strict
liability to him] may encourage a greater caution in purchasing equipment and examin-
ing for defects." 100 N.J. Super. at 232, 241 A.2d at 642 (Botter, J., dissenting).
'5 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963) (per curiam); see notes 119-38 infra & accom-
panying text.
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Newnark v. Gimbel's, Inc. ,76 the court should consider at an early
stage the degree to which it believes the service providers are
guided by ordinary commercial considerations (profit maximiz-
ing) in their choice of techniques in order to gauge the likeli-
hood that a different implied guarantee standard would alter
these choices and thereby transform the quality of services avail-
able to consumers.
The majority of services regularly purchased pass these
preliminary inquiries without even raising any borderline ques-
tions, because circumstances such as extensive legislative or peer
group regulation and non-commercial motivations are irregular,
although present in some highly visible and frequently dis-
cussed markets.7 7 Having been sensitized by the preliminary
inquiries to any unusual aspects of the implied guarantee's role
in the market being investigated, the court then should embark
on what is basically a balancing test between negligence and
implied warranty rules by utilizing the major considerations
outlined previously. The relevant areas of inquiry may be sche-
matized in a question oriented checklist: (1) Impact on oppor-
tunism and deterioration-Can one expect a proposed rule to
have any impact on particular information-related problems
in a specific market? (2) Transaction costs-Are the legal trans-
action costs associated with a proposed rule unnecessarily great,
perhaps sufficiently so to dissuade consumers from seeking to
enforce theoretically existing rights? (3) Incentives to ineffi-
ciency-Does the rule limit or multiply the natural market in-
centives for inefficient behavior on the part of producers or
consumers? (4) Boundaries on allowable risks-Does the pro-
posed rule construct an appropriate boundary line for the con-
sumer risks that society wishes to see available in the market,
driving out the unwanted and preserving those needed or de-
sired? (5) Marketplace justice-Does the proposed standard
comport with society's basic notions of marketplace justice?
These considerations are by no means totally foreign to
courts previously confronted with implied guarantee questions,
76 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); see notes 139-59 infra & accompanying text.
" Focus on the few highly visible services (especially the medical field) in which
these unusual circumstances do occur may have seriously slowed advances that could
have rightly protected consumers in more everyday situations. The courts justifiable
hesitance to abandon the negligence rule in these high visibility professional services
may help to explain the many pronouncements and decisions that retarded the exten-
sion of warranty concepts in the service area at the same time that such protections
were expanding elsewhere. See notes 94-98 infra & accompanying text.
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and earlier service cases can be located in which some of these
elements have been tacitly or even explicitly recognized. 78 The
courts, however, have lacked consistently a comprehensive set
of essential inquiries based on a carefully articulated view of
buyer-seller interaction and the impact of legally-implied guar-
antees upon that interaction. This framework represents an
attempt to fill that gap. With the relevant inquiries in mind,
representative cases concerning the appropriate legal rule for
service markets can be analyzed to demonstrate how the pro-
posed model can assist the courts in dealing with future cases
in this evolving area of law.
78 Information impactedness has been mentioned as a reason to extend implied
warranty to some services. See, e.g., Jeffreys v. Hickman, 132 Ill. App. 2d 272, 269
N.E.2d 110 (1971); Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951). Perhaps
more subtly, one court explicitly denied an implied warranty because the service pro-
vider had clearly warned the customer that he really did not know how to achieve the
customer's purpose and had gone ahead only at the customer's repeated insistence.
Mercedes Dusting Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 353 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
Two courts acknowledged that strict liability developed in the goods context in
large part to circumvent the enormous legal transaction costs that prevented injured
consumers from obtaining redress, but these courts found such difficulties absent in the
face-to-face dealings that characterize service markets. This constituted part of the basis
for the courts' rejection of the applicability of strict liability to services. La Rossa v.
Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1968); Hoffman v. Simplot Avia-
tion, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, -, 539 P.2d 584, 588 (1975).
The incentive-to-inefficiency considerations have not generally permeated service
cases, although a Mississippi court did apply strict liability to a plumbing contractor for
the installation service he performed, on the grounds that he could have more effi-
ciently prevented the defect than could the original manufacturer, who provided instal-
lation instructions ignored by the contractor. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.
2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. Yates v. Hodges, 386 U.S. 912 (1967). One non-
service case, Kobeckis v. Budzko, 225 A.2d 418 (Me. 1967), in which a consumer put a
product to abnormal use, provides a particularly excellent example of a court unwilling
to shift the responsibility for injury back to the sellers because such a rule would re-
move from consumers the obligation to take obviously efficient self-protective measures
that are widely known and readily understood.
The risk boundary problem was explicitly discussed in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.,
54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). See text accompanying note 148 infra. But the classic
example of an attempt to deal with this issue is Justice Traynor's opinion in a goods
case, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15-19, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21-24, 403 P.2d
145, 149-52 (1965). Justice Traynor also noted that because the plaintiff could have
shopped around for a truck more suitable to his needs, he bore the risk that the prod-
uct he chose would not meet his expectations, absent an assurance by the manufacturer
that it would. Id. at 19, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24, 403 P.2d at 152. Under the circum-
stances, any other risk allocation would have generated inefficiency on the consumer
side by dulling the buyer's incentive to shop around. Allowable risk concerns have also
motivated other courts to extend implied warranties to services posing special dangers
to consumers if not done properly. See Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison
Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 330, 196 N.W.2d 316, 318 (1972). But see Chutich v. Samuel-
son, 187 Colo. 155, 529 P.2d 631 (1974) (en banc), rev'g 33 Colo. App. 195 (1973).
Citations are hardly necessary to demonstrate that courts have considered concepts
of individual justice in deciding implied gurantee service cases.
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III. JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING CONCERNING APPROPRIATE
IMPLIED GUARANTEES
A. The Current State of the Law
The current majority view is that the extensive implied
warranties for the sale of goods outlined in Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code79 do not apply to service transactions.
8 0
The consumer's chances of recovering damages for unsatisfac-
tory services depend instead on his ability to demonstrate neg-
ligence by the service provider .8 The issue is sometimes con-
fused by the tendency of the courts to speak the language of
implied warranties, although characterizing the protection af-
forded as an "implied warranty of workmanlike performance, "82
which is simply a negligence rule. Typifying this disposition
is the court's statement in Garcia v. Color Tile Distributing Co. ,83
describing the responsibility of those providing the service of
floor installation:
[H]aving undertaken to render services in the practice
of a skilled trade, [the service provider] impliedly war-
ranted that it would exercise such reasonable degree
of skill as the nature of the service required .... [T]he
degree of care necessarily required by one who under-
takes to render services to another in the practice of
a trade which is the result of acquired learning, or de-
veloped through special training and experience is
that which a reasonably prudent man, skilled in such
work, would exercise.
8 4
In a handful of service cases, courts have articulated or applied
an implied warranty theory that transcends the negligence stan-
dard, 5 but these cases represent the minority view.
79 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, -315.
8 See, e.g., Howard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 248 F. Supp. 527, 532 (S.D.W. Va.
1965); Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Associates, Inc., 168 So.
2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1964), cert. denied, 173 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1965). For a
detailed discussion of the current state of the law in this area and an extensive number
of relevant case citations, see Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transac-
tions-mplied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661, 663-83.
8 See, e.g., Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833
(Alas. 1967); Myers v. Ravenna Motors, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 613, 468 P.2d 1012 (1970).
82 See, e.g., Isthmian Lines, Inc. v. Canadian Stevedoring Co., 216 F. Supp. 856, 861
(D. Ore. 1963); Reliable Elec. Co. v. Clinton Campbell Contractor, Inc., 10 Ariz. App.
371, 374, 459 P.2d 98, 101 (1969); cf. Jamison Fertilizer Co. v. White Motor Co., 246
Ore. 610, 425 P.2d 191 (1967).
83 75 N.M. 570, 408 P.2d 145 (1965).
"Id. at 573, 408 P.2d at 148.
" See Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 584, 360 P.2d 897, 902,
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In the past decade, the significance of implied warranties
as a vehicle for recovery by dissatisfied consumers has been sub-
stantially reduced by the rapid expansion of the strict liability
in tort approach articulated in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts8 6 and in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
8 7
Section 402A explicitly refers to defective "products," and the
courts have been nearly unanimous in refusing to extend this
concept to service transactions. 88 The so-called sale-service
hybrid cases following the path of Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc. ,89
suggested the rule that a seller supplying a defective product
incident to provision of a service should be held strictly liable
for resulting consumer injuries. 911 Even this proposition has not
been universally accepted, however, and many jurisdictions re-
fuse to accept any extension of strict liability to transactions that
are predominantly of services. 91 Moreover, consumers receiv-
ing worthless services but not suffering physical injury are often
handicapped by the rule that strict liability cannot be used as the
basis of recovering economic losses, such as the value of the
item purchased.
92
The conclusion is reached quickly that the current law of
implied guarantees offers substantially less protection to con-
sumers of services than it does to consumers of goods. Although
service markets are more susceptible than goods markets to
the severe information impactedness problems necessitating a
legal guarantee rule or some other mechanism to curb deterio-
12 Cal. Rptr. 257, 263 (1961) (warranty implied for labor and materials used in installa-
tion of heating system); Jeffreys v. Hickman, 132 Ill. App. 2d 272, 269 N.E.2d 110
(1971) (implied warranty to paint car includes lesser warranty that paint job will endure
for a reasonable time); Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich.
App. 325, 330, 196 N.W.2d 316, 318 (1972) (implied warranty connected with provi-
sion of electrical service); McCool v. Hoover Equip. Co., 415 P.2d 954, 958 (Okla.
1966) (service of rechroming crankshafts includes implied warranty that shafts will not
fail due to defective chroming).
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
8 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975);
Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton, 85 N.M. 679, 515 P.2d 1283 (1973).
89 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
90 See Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 481 P.2d 924 (1971).
"' See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965). Even the "hybrid" cases, see note 90 supra & accompanying text, may not apply
to the situation in which the service component is "predominant" in the transaction. See
Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 442-43, 481 P.2d 924, 926 (1971)
("[T]he sale is a hybrid partaking of both a sale and a service .... [W]e cannot say that
either part of the transaction predominated over the other.").
92 See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965).
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ration and opportunism,93 the current standard for service
transactions is less protective than that ordinarily applied to the
sale of goods. This discrepancy demands a careful investigation
of the relevant cases to learn the reasons given for this differ-
ence in treatment and to discern the judiciary's sensitivity to
the considerations advanced in this Comment.
Many of the cases in which courts have been asked to re-
consider the legal rules for service transactions reveal little ex-
cept a judicial propensity to state sweeping and familiar legal
conclusions with scant regard for underlying motivations and
policies. Courts very often begin and end their consideration of
the problem with a few blunt comments, such as: "We regard it
as the better part of wisdom not to extend as a matter of law
implied warranties from sales to service contracts. '94 According-
ly, "[w]e will just stay with that reliable fellow-the reasonably
prudent man.
9 5
To a significant extent this cursory treatment of the prob-
lem is based on two simple propositions: (1) implied warranties
and strict liability apply to the sale of goods-referred to simply
as sales, and (2) service transactions are just not sales. 96 Reliance
on this sale-service distinction has impeded efforts to resolve
93 Although blanket comparisons are difficult, services have been seen above to
pose several special problems for consumers-uncertainty, complexity, individual pro-
duction, no chance for inspection-so that the possibility looms large that fewer services
than goods are in either of the benign market categories (nonimpacted or rich experi-
ences).
91 Samuelson v. Chutich, 185 Colo. 155, 158, 529 P.2d 631, 633 (1974) (en banc)
(emphasis in original).
95 1d. at 159, 529 P.2d at 634. Similarly, another court stated: "An engineer, or any
other so-called professional, does not 'warrant' his service or the tangible evidence of
his skill to be 'merchantable' or 'fit for an intended use.' These are terms uniquely
applicable to goods." Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt Associates,
Inc., 168 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 173 So. 2d 146 (Fla.
1965). A few key citations are normally added, but no fresh analysis is regarded as
necessary because, as an Idaho court recently explained in denying the applicability of
strict liability to repair services: "Almost uniformly any such extension of the rule has
been consistently and expressly rejected." Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho
32, -, 539 P.2d 584, 587 (1975). "The rationale has been thoroughly explored in the
authorities and commentators set forth above and reiteration herein would serve no
purpose." Id. at -, 539 P.2d at 588. Although that court actually did provide a
glimpse of its reasons for denial of strict liability, the casual attitude toward the need to
explore carefully the issues and competing policies mirrors much of the case law in the
area.
96 Recent commentary has criticized extensively the sale-service dichotomy and ar-
gued for its abandonment, particularly in the area of strict tort liability, on historical,
economic, and policy grounds. See, e.g., Comment, Sale-Service Hybrid Transactions: A
Policy Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575 (1974); Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response
to the New Industrial State: The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 401 (1974).
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appropriately hybrid cases involving both sale and service
aspects by encouraging the judiciary to categorize factual situa-
tions mechanically. The tendency is readily observable in cases
dealing with hospitals' and blood banks' liability to patients con-
tracting hepatitis as a result of transfusions of infected blood.
97
Recognizing, then, that many courts deal with service cases in
a-most superficial and unsatisfactory manner,98 this Comment
looks past this mass of cases to a few outstanding examples of
those less frequent cases in which courts grapple with some of
the basic issues. These courts' conclusions-either finding
valid reasons to deny extending implied guarantees to service
transactions or suggesting that some service providers be sub-
ject to a stricter standard than the traditional negligence rule-
will be explored, and the framework presented here will be
applied to determine if it could have helped the courts deal with
the difficult questions they faced.
9 7 Jurisdictions vary in their responses to the question whether a blood transfusion
constitutes a "sale" of blood by the supplier hospital. Compare Perlmutter v. Beth David
Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954), with Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp., 47 Il. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
98 The judicial caution in applying warranty and strict liability concepts to service
cases, presumably based on the "products" wording of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and the Uniform Commercial Code's exclusive application of implied warranties to the sale
of goods, is particularly anamolous when viewed in light of the frequent examples of
past judicial activism in this general area of law. This "failure of nerve" in the service
area has been rejected by leading commentators who consistently stress the past trend
of activism and the continuing need to view statutory frameworks not as boundary
lines, but as invitations to apply similar legal rules to analogous situations outside the
statute's limits. See, e.g., Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUm. L. REV. 653 (1957); Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447 (1971).
In one sense, the entire development of strict liability can be viewed as a judicial
refusal to be bound by the statutory "intricacies" of the "law of sales." This was the view
of Justice Traynor in his path breaking opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963), and the
concept of a more flexible set of legal rules for consumer transactions was repeatedly
stressed in the early strict liability decisions. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Many courts have taken advantage of opportunities to.
extend the implied warranties statutorily provided for goods by the state codifications
of the Uniform Commercial Code to areas outside the purview of Article 2, such as the sale
of new housing and the leasing of goods. See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319
(Alas. 1970); W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla.
1970); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
Such past departures required careful analysis of the rationale for these implied
guarantees and a willingness to expand upon narrow precedents and legislative man-
dates, neither of which are possible within the confines of a rigid adherence to the
sale-service distinction. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court insisted in refusing to fol-
low a lower court's summary dismissal of a service-based warranty claim, such decisions
should not be made "without sufficient inquiry as to whether the policies for which
warranties are implied in law would be furthered by their implication in this situation."
Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 508, 267 A.2d 867, 871 (1970).
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B. Gagne-Unresolved Contradictions in an Important Precedent
Gagne v. Bertran9" is perhaps the best known case recogniz-
ing that implied warranties are not necessarily limited to the
sale of goods but nonetheless arriving at the conclusion that ser-
vice providers should not be held to more than the usual neg-
ligence rule. In Gagne, the plaintiff hired a soil tester to measure
the fill depth of a possible construction site. Informed that the
tests showed the fill to extend only about one foot below the
surface, the plaintiff proceeded to buy the lots, only to learn
after construction on the property had begun that the fill ac-
tually went as deep as three to six feet. After incurring sub-
stantial unanticipated construction costs, he sued the soil tester
under theories of negligence, deceit, and breach of implied
warranty. Justice Traynor's basic response, perhaps cited and
quoted as frequently as any statement by a court denying im-
plied warranty claims in service cases, 100 appears in his discus-
sion of the plaintiff's negligence claim:
The services of experts are sought because of their
special skill. They have a duty to exercise the ordinary
skill and competence of members of their profession,
and a failure to discharge that duty will subject them
to liability for negligence. Those who hire such persons
are not justified in expecting infallibility, but can ex-
pect only reasonable care and competence. They pur-
chase service, not insurance.' 0 '
Earlier, in specifically rejecting the implied warranty claim,
Justice Traynor concluded that "[t]he general rule is applicable
that those who sell their services for the guidance of others in
their economic, financial, and personal affairs are not liable in
the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct."' 0 2 Thus
two superficial incongruities are immediately manifest: (1) the
denial of an implied warranty is based on the application of a
general rule covering only those services relating to expert guid-
ance and advice (presumably exempting stock brokers from
liability, but not auto mechanics), and (2) the words so commonly
quoted in rejecting implied warranties' 0 3 actually uphold an
action for negligence.
99 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
100 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, -, 539 P.2d 584,
589 (1975).
101 Id. at 489, 275 P.2d at 21.
102 Id. at 487, 275 P.2d at 20.
103 See notes 100-0 1 supra & accompanying text.
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Other substantive contradictions haunt the opinion. In
ostensibly rejecting the breach of warranty claim, Justice Tray-
nor spoke primarily of express warranties, concluding that
"there was no express warranty agreement, and there is noth-
ing in the evidence to indicate that defendant assumed respon-
sibility for the accuracy of his statements."' 1 14 Nevertheless, in
accepting the plaintiff's deceit theory, Justice Traynor empha-
sized that the defendant stated an opinion concerning fill depth
that he could not reasonably have believed and upon which he
knew the plaintiff would justifiably rely.105 If the statement of
an opinion by the service provider induces 'justifiable reliance"
by the customer-the court acknowledged that the soil tester
made no special promises about the accuracy of his reports-
then for all practical purposes the court implied a warranty
within the soil tester's report and found the defendant liable
because he failed to make appropriate disclaimers. Similarly, in
his discussion of the evidence supporting the negligence claim,
Justice Traynor declared the persuasive indicators of negligence
to be the testimony of the defendant's employee who assisted
in the fill test and observed fill at a four to five foot depth and
"the testimony of the persons who dug the foundation
trenches.' 1 6 The trenchdiggers would have been competent
to testify only to the actual fill depth, not to the methods used
by the soil tester; the court, therefore, apparently regarded
testimony indicating that the soil tester's results were erroneous
as persuasive evidence of negligence. Emphasis on result, how-
ever, is more appropriate to an implied warranty analysis
than to a negligence claim. Thus both the deceit and the neg-
ligence arguments accepted by the court contain strong ele-
ments of an implied warranty theory despite the court's insis-
tence that it rejected the applicability of the implied warranty
claim. 107
The analytic framework suggested here could have helped
the Gagne court avoid or at least recognize many of these in-
consistencies. The court indirectly gave positive responses to
the three suggested preliminary questions' 0 8 it mentioned.
104 43 Cal. 2d at 487, 275 P.2d at 20.
,05 Id. at 488, 275 P.2d at 20.
'
6 
Id. at 490, 275 P.2d at 21.
07 Id. at 487, 275 P.2d at 20. The final twist in this remarkable opinion is the
court's determination that, despite being entitled to recover on both negligence and
deceit grounds, the plaintiffs had thus far not shown any damages. Id. at 492, 275 P.2d
at 23. For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see 43 CALIF. L. REV. 356 (1955).
108 See notes 74-76 supra & accompanying text.
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First, the transaction was described as one characterized by in-
formation impactedness: "Defendant held himself out as an
expert, plaintiffs hired him to supply information concerning
matters of which they were ignorant .... 109 Soil testing ser-
vices apparently can be critically evaluated after purchase.
Therefore, the information impactedness problems arising in
this market are probably most like those in "limited experi-
ences" markets, 110 suggesting a combination of opportunism
and deterioration. Second, the court's references to the more
complex and presumably more accurate soil tests performed by
soil engineers and geologists indicated that a range of tech-
niques are available for performing this service.11' Third, on
the question of profit-maximizing, the court implied that at least
some service providers would try to take advantage of their
inside information, noting that this defendant, fully cognizant
of the unsatisfactory manner of his testing, when reporting the
results "did not give his statement in the form of an opinion but
as a representation of fact."' 1 2 The court did not consider the
question of the presence of other possible forces to curb dete-
rioration or opportunism, but the opinion's failure to mention
special licensing rules, work regulations, or professional codes
for soil testers allows us to assume their absence and insert our
own affirmative answer to that final preliminary inquiry.
The positive responses to the preliminary inquiries indi-
cate that the basic assumptions underlying the predictions of
market outcomes and the explanation of the role of legally im-
plied guarantees fit the particular case, and the considerations
identified earlier to guide the choice of a legal rule"13 can and
should be applied. In deciding whether an effort-oriented neg-
o 43 Cal. 2d at 489, 275 P.2d at 21.
C15 consumers can judge the accuracy of soil test reports when the land is put to
some use that requires extensive digging and the true fill depth is revealed. Although
contractors and some others may regularly require such services, plaintiff apparently
previously purchased this type of service only four times in a three year period, and not
at all in the last five years. Id. at 484, 275 P.2d at 18. Presumably some customers in
this market make more regular use of soil tests, so that the problems here are less
severe than in pure limited experiences market. This case also demonstrates key aspects
of cue-reliant buying because of the indications that this buyer chose this soil tester on
the basis of a brief string of favorable past experiences that led him to overestimate the
true quality of this tester's work. Id. The case exemplifies the difficulties inherent in
attempting to pigeonhole an entire service market into one of the four categories de-
veloped above. Subdivision of consumers into groups often will be necessary to enable
estimation of the net effect that the diverse forces generated by the groups have upon
the full market.
I IIId. at 490, 275 P.2d at 21.
112 Id. at 489, 275 P.2d at 21.
113 See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
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ligence rule or an outcome-oriented implied warranty rule
would be the more appropriate law of implied guarantee for
the soil testing market, the crucial concerns stressed-the im-
pact on opportunism and deterioration, the transaction costs
of enforcement, the possible incentives to inefficiency, the
implied boundary line on allowable risks, and the justness of the
outcome-provide a relatively stable basis for decision. Out-
come-oriented rules are superior in curbing the type of oppor-
tunism operative in Gagne, where the soil tester failed to disclose
the flimsiness of his procedures and findings and subsequently
represented himself as a fully qualified expert. The enforce-
ment obstacles to the consumer are necessarily higher under a
negligence rule than under an implied warranty, simply because
a plaintiff must prove more. Consequently, in many cases, in-
cluding the instant one, only fortuitous events such as the avail-
ability of the participating employee's testimony" 4 enable
consumer plaintiffs to vault those obstacles. Neither rule
threatens to produce major inefficiencies on either the producer
or consumer side. On the one hand, soil testers would not adopt
unnecessarily complex procedures merely to meet an effort-
related standard of care; on the consumer side, the unavailabil-
ity of information mitigates the concern that application of a
liability rule would discourage consumers from utilizing self-
protective measures.
The court's refusal to deviate from the traditional negli-
gence rule appears related to its deep but misdirected concern
for the remaining two components, individual justice and the
boundary of allowable risks. Justice Traynor espoused a "gen-
eral rule" of no liability absent negligence for those contribut-
ing "guidance of others in their economic, financial, and per-
sonal affairs .... 11115 This rule, compelled by the presumption
against the expectation of "infallibility,"' 1 6 constitutes an im-
portant element of our social concept of individual justice in the
marketplace. But although this expression of social concern is
perhaps apposite to psychologists, investment brokers, minis-
ters, and other advice givers, the rule hardly fits a soil tester
who reports on an objectively measurable factual matter. Thus,
an appropriate consideration of marketplace justice was em-
ployed in an inappropriate context; the desire to shield a sin-
cere psychologist whose best recommendations fail to solve a
"i Id. at 490, 275 P.2d at 21.
115 Id. at 487, 275 P.2d at 20.
" 6 ld. at 489, 275 P.2d at21.
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patient's problems should not extend to a soil tester who pro-
vides inaccurate reports.
Secondly, the court's conclusion that the low price paid
indicates the lack of any guarantee suggests that a low price
purchases only a report devoid of promises. Apparently, this
low-cost, no assurance alternative is within the boundaries of
the marketplace risks that consumers should be allowed to bear.
An outcome-oriented rule containing a merchantability stan-
dard would have enabled the court to maintain this attitude
without rejecting the implied warranty theory. In fact, the
threat of additional successful negligence claims against low-cost
operators such as the Gagne soil tester poses a greater danger
of driving this "desirable" option off the market than does a
carefully enforced merchantability rule that places heavy stress
on the price signal.
1 7
The proposed inquiries would not save the Gagne court
from ultimately having to resolve certain fundamental tensions
in the opinion, particularly the dichotomy between faulting the
soil tester for pretending to be an expert and recoiling from
imposition of full liability because of the belief that the low price
should have warned the customer that no guarantees were in-
cluded. On balance, however, an implied warranty approach
emerges as the preferred alternative to a traditional negligence
rule because of its reduced enforcement obstacles and greater
sensitivity to opportunism. Through careful application of the
concepts of merchantability and consequential damages, an
implied warranty rule also offers a more acceptable definition
of the boundaries of allowable marketplace risks by providing
the flexibility required to ease the opinion's basic tensions. If the
strength of the low price signal were deemed great, and if such
inexpensive, if not fully reliable, soil testing services were found
to be desirable marketplace risks, the implied warranty theory
could be upheld even while recovery was denied, on the ground
that the service received was merchantable for the price paid.
On the other hand, if some relief were desirable in order to
limit the availability of such unreliable work and protect the
consumer who 'Justifiably relied" on the service provider, the
service could be found unmerchantable, but recovery restrained
by the reasoning relied on in Gagne-the real injury proximately
"7 Under the court's analysis, if a significant percentage of reports were erroneous,
practically all services performed by these nongeologists would be classified as negli-
gent, regardless of the low price, thereby posing a substantial threat to their continued
presence on the market.
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caused by the breach was the difference between the value of
the land calculated with its true fill depth known and the price
actually paid. 118 The increased construction costs could then
be regarded as consequential damages too remote to be recover-
able. In any event, with the aid of these inquiries, the incon-
sistent arguments that plague the opinion could have been
avoided. These inconsistencies caused the unnecessary rejec-
tion of an implied warranty rule, despite clear advantages of
the rule in this type of service market.
C. Broyles-Uncertainty as a Faulty Boundary
on Implied Warranties
Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co. 119 represents another ex-
ample of a court grappling with the question of the guarantee
standard to be applied to a service market. In a case involving
the hiring of an incorporated group of civil engineers to pro-
vide plans for a drainage system, the court this time applied
an implied warranty rule.
Immediately noteworthy is the court's traditional and un-
derstated approach, which produces a potentially sweeping
holding in the terms of conventional contract analysis: "An ac-
tion for breach of duty arising out of a contract of employment,
express or implied, to accomplish a particular result, is based
on failure to perform the special agreement regardless of neg-
ligence."' 2 0 With this one brief comment and a few cites to other
jurisdictions, the opinion quickly encompasses a vast range of
service transactions. Hiring someone to fix a broken refriger-
ator, move one's belongings, repair a carburetor, or mow a
lawn, nestles comfortably into the general category "of employ-
ment to accomplish a particular result."
From this starting point, the court's key to finding the
engineers liable for the failure of their plans was to establish
the existence of an implied contract to successfully achieve a
particular result, because no explicit guarantee existed. Once
again the court turned to traditional contract concepts, assert-
ing: "An implied contract arises where there are circumstances
which, according to the ordinary course of dealing and common
understanding, show a mutual intent to contract."'121 Noting
that the engineers represented themselves as experts and that
118 43 Cal. 2d at 490-92, 275 P.2d at 21-23.
119 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963) (per curiam).
120 Id. at 38, 151 So. 2d at 770.
121 Id.
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all parties understood the functional requisites of the drainage
system, the court concluded:
[A]s we view all the circumstances and the nature of
the contract, . . . the parties mutually intended an
agreement of guaranty as to the sufficiency and ade-
quacy of the plans and specifications to accomplish
proper and adequate drainage. To hold otherwise
would be to ignore practical and common sense im-
plications that arise from contractual dealings and
negotiations as here presented in the complaint.1 22
The only distinguishing features of the "dealings and ne-
gotiations as here presented" were the alleged expertness of the
service, the customer's express need for the attainment of a
specific result, and the service provider's acceptance of the job
with an awareness of that need, but without making any explicit
promise to achieve the particular result. These features, how-
ever, may characterize numerous other service transactions.
Thus, the court's superficially unstartling, traditionally worded
analysis arrived at a conclusion that on its face makes many, if
not most, service transactions subject to an implied warranty
standard, rather than to the familiar negligence rule. 123
In determining the applicability of an implied warranty
rule, the Broyles court analyzed few of the suggested relevant
market considerations. The court did refer to one of the es-
sential elements of an information impacted situation, noting
that "defendant professed to be expert or held himself out to
be . . .".24 The court also indicated that an implied warranty
rule possesses advantages over the negligence standard both
because of reduced enforcement obstacles 125 and because of
greater marketplace justice. 126 Nonetheless, the tone of the
opinion and its stress on mutuality of intent are basically at odds
with the approach advocated here. Broyles fails to concentrate on
the market impact of different legal rules and make a con-
1
22
Id. at 38, 151 So. 2d at 771.
123 The Broyles decision has yet to serve as a growth point in the law, despite its ap-
parent potential for such a role. See Note, Implied Warranties in Service Contracts, 39
NOTRE DAME LAw. 680 (1964). Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d
584 (1975) is typical of recent cases explicitly refusing to follow Broyles.
124 275 Ala. at 38, 151 So. 2d at 771.
125 Id. at 40, 151 So. 2d at 772 ("Such allegations [of negligence] cast on him a
difficult burden of proof.").
12' Id. ("Resistance as here to accountability does not dissipate the fairness and jus-
tice of such an implication.").
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scious and openly expressed choice between such rules based
primarily upon their respective impacts.
127
This deficiency comes into sharp focus in the later sections
of the opinion where the court attempted to circumscribe the
applicability of its holding. No effort was made to define more
precisely the key phrase, "contractual dealings and negotiations
as here presented," in terms of more ordinary services than
those provided by civil engineers. The opinion does, however,
note: "We recognize that in the absence of an express contract,
the courts are reluctant to construe contractual dealings and
services of lawyers, physicians and architects, and probably
some other professions, as implying a contract of guaranty or
insurance of favorable results.' 128 The court further explained
that in construing the warranty accompanying other services,
"[i]t all depends on the nature of the employment and the par-
ticular services rendered," especially the extent to which ele-
ments beyond the control of the service provider temper the
outcome. 129 Thus, the traditional negligence rule should be
retained if external forces substantially affect the eventual re-
sult.
To evaluate its persuasiveness and reach, the Broyles opin-
ion must be examined in light of the theories and model sug-
gested by this Comment. Although the existence of production
uncertainties is definitely one element to be weighed, this cri-
terion alone cannot determine adequately the proper reach of
the implied warranty doctrine. The basic weakness of the un-
certainty standard is demonstrated through consideration of the
proposed preliminary concerns-information impactedness,
range of techniques, profit-maximizing behavior, and curbs
on deterioration and opportunism. 131 Although the Broyles
court apparently perceived the applicability of the first in-
quiry-virtually all complex service markets are characterized
1
27 
But see Note, Extension of Warranty Concept to Service-Sales Contracts, 31 IND. L.J.
367 (1956). That commentator stresses that "the expectations of the parties must be
considered.... It follows that implied warranties should apply to service contracts only
when a specific result can reasonably be expected and is a basis of the bargain." Id. 375
(emphasis supplied). This statement, following on the heels of an assertion that clients
do not expect their lawyers to win, but merely to try hard, exemplifies the contrast with
the argument set forth in this analysis. Instead of using the concept of "reasonable
expectations" to tell consumers that the law may not recognize the validity of what they
in fact believe, the suggested focus here is on the actual expectations of consumers, the
role of sellers in manipulating and responding to those expectations, and the market-
place impact of such attitudes and behavior.
12' 275 Ala. at 38, 151 So. 2d at 771.
129 Id.
130 See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
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by one or more of the described varieties of information im-
pactedness-the court neglected to consider whether the service
providers have available a range of techniques possessing vary-
ing success probabilities. Instead, the opinion asks if the prob-
ability of success is substantially less than 100 percent.1 31 This
question is inadequate because even providers of intensely com-
plex professional services have access to a range of techniques.
Law firms may be able to alter considerably the probability of
prevailing in a certain case by their assignment of particular
attorneys to conduct the litigation, their willingness to incur
costs in preparation for trial, and their reduction of outside
responsibilities for the attorneys litigating the case. Similarly,
doctors regularly choose between different techniques in rec-
ommending further tests or preliminary treatment for their
patients. They do not routinely admit every patient who com-
plains of shortness of breath to the hospital for an exhaustive
battery of tests to check for every possible condition relating to
this symptom, although to do so would theoretically increase the
probability of appropriate treatment. Therefore, courts must
recognize that despite the substantial degree of result uncer-
tainty connected with providing very complex services, skilled
professionals can affect significantly the probability of success.
Stricter implied guarantees might motivate the choice of more
desirable techniques. Accordingly, the Broyles observation that
some service providers face substantial performance uncer-
tainties is analytically insufficient to preclude automatically the
use of implied warranties in service markets.1 32
Having affirmatively answered this second preliminary
inquiry by observing that skilled professionals possess a range
of techniques, the court should have analyzed the third and
fourth components-profit-maximizing by service providers
due to their inside information, and existence of forces within
the market to curb deterioration and opportunism. Instead,
131 That is essentially the meaning of the court's statements concerning services in
which the outcome "depends on factors beyond the control of the practitioner" and the
whole enterprise is "to a great degree experimental." 275 Ala. at 38-39, 151 So. 2d at
771. This same inquiry has been effectively precluded in goods markets because the
basic expression of strict liability for manufacturers specifies that a seller will be held
liable even though he "has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a), at 348 (1965). Thus, produc-
tion uncertainties cannot shield providers of goods from liability.
132 The ability of legally implied guarantees to motivate the choice of different
techniques is as relevant here as it was in the above analysis, regardless of the presence
of greater production uncertainties. There is no logical reason why such uncertainties,
standing alone, should compel us to leave the choice of techniques to the unmodified
behavior of sellers in markets that are still characterized by information impactedness.
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Broyles asserts that when production is uncertain, common sense
and dealing suggest that no guarantees are implied. The court's
confusion ensues from its exclusive consideration of examples
of professional services, although surely these are not the only
types of services marked by substantial production uncertain-
ties. Prevalent notions of true professionalism suggest that
profit-maximizing does not occur and curbs on opportunism
and deterioration may be unnecessary."' 3 Thus, many of the
proffered market deterioration and opportunism predictions
may not be applicable to true professions. Society perceives
that well-trained professionals "do the best they can," largely be-
cause of professional ethical codes, entrance requirements, and
socialization mechanisms. These critical forces may check much
of the deterioration and opportunism that strike more wholly
commercial markets. One expects professionals to carefully
weigh costs and benefits, but primarily as a type of agent for
the client/patient, and not to take advantage of his trust.
The predominantly negative responses to the preliminary
inquiries indicate that the implied guarantee rule does not serve
quite the same functions in markets dominated by "service-
professionalism ideals" that it does in more commercial settings.
The key implication is not that professionals would fail to alter
their behavior if the standard were changed, but rather that
stricter liability standards are unlikely to coax professional ser-
vice providers who adhere to the ideals of their profession into
utilizing more careful production techniques.1 3 4 Imposition of
liability for an unsuccessful result under a legal guarantee rule
may effectuate certain behavioral modifications, such as induc-
ing practitioners to adopt defensive medicine techniques and
abandon high risk activities, but these alterations do not neces-
sarily signify a higher quality of care.
In terms of the other suggested considerations for evaluat-
ing the relative merits of different legal standards, the use of
"I Professionals might well be calculating and even profit oriented in matters of
where to practice, what specialty to enter, and other similar considerations. Such be-
havior would not, however, characterize decisions pertaining to the appropriate level of
care in performing their particular service for any individual customers. For a clear
statement of the "service ideal" as the defining characteristic of true professions, see
Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS:
BASIC STUDIES (0. Grusky & G. Miller eds. 1970).
134 Although the discussion points generally in the opposite direction, there may be
other compelling reasons to opt for stricter liability standards. The recognition that one
is unlikely to motivate improved techniques surely does not terminate the quest for the
optimal legal standard of implied guarantee for such a market. Rather, its effect is to
remove one key element, the likelihood of creating incentives that will lead to technique
upgrading, from the balance that otherwise favors the outcome-related type of rule.
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outcome-oriented rules in professional markets can obviate
some of the producer and consumer inefficiencies of effort-
oriented negligence rules,'135 but only at the cost of what may be
a wholly inappropriate definition of the boundary of allowable
risk. Society is not likely to want surgeons to refuse to operate
simply because there is only a slim chance the patient will re-
cover. The use of such outcome-oriented rules may also pose a
fairly major affront to society's sense of marketplace justice
1 36
by imposing liability on highly skilled persons who have done
their best to successfully complete tasks posing enormous chal-
lenges and defying favorable resolution on a regular basis.
Thus the Broyles court may have stumbled onto a proper
distinction between professional and non-professional markets,
although mistakenly expressing the difference in terms of mere
production uncertainties. Two critical caveats need to be em-
phasized at this point. First, some groups seeking to label them-
selves professions may not adhere to the "service ideal" to an
extent warranting this advanced analysis, even if perceived to
do so by sizable segments of the populace.' 37 Courts may feel
that such service providers generally take advantage of their
special information and that ethical codes and minimum cer-
tification requirements fail to effectively counteract opportun-
ism and deterioration. In that case, the potential of legally im-
plied guarantees to combat these problems must be added to the
equation in order to determine if a shift to a stricter, outcome-
oriented rule might not indeed offer advantages. 38 Second,
the choice of the familiar negligence rule does not imply that
professional service providers will never be found liable. The
negligence rule is a sort of litmus test of adherence to the ser-
vice ideal. If one provides services in a manner measuring up
to the standard of acceptable practice in the profession, then
no liability will follow upon unfavorable results. Deviations from
that standard, however, will occasion liability if the desired re-
sults are not produced.
Thus, an effort-oriented rule may be particularly appro-
priate for a truly "service ideal" type market, so long as the stan-
3 5 See notes 65-68 supra & accompanying text.
'3 6 See notes 72-73 supra & accompanying text.
,' For an indication that numerous members of the medical profession, which
surely is regarded as adhering to the "service ideal," often are failing to merit the
designation, see U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 13, 1976, at 55.
138 The assumption that choice of techniques decisions are made on a profit-
oriented basis would once again be the starting point of the analysis, despite the service
providers' claim that they are guided by the "service ideal."
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dard employed does not include superfluous elements encom-
passed by "defensive practice." One cannot, however, properly
define the services requiring such different rules by sole reli-
ance on the Broyles court uncertainty criterion. Rather, one must
carefully examine both the enumerated preliminary inquiries
and balancing considerations to make appropriately these dif-
ficult distinctions.
D. Newmark-Long Step Toward Useful Analysis
Beginning with a resounding rejection of the sale-service
distinction as a basis for decision, Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.'39
perhaps comes closest to the analysis urged here. The trial court
dismissed the warranty claim of Mrs. Newmark, whose hair and
scalp were severely burned after a cold wave was applied by a
beauty parlor operator, because her transaction with the beauty
parlor was not a sale under New Jersey's version of the Uniform
Commercial Code. The New Jersey Supreme Court flatly rejected
that nonanalysis: "Having in mind the nature of a permanent
wave operation, we find that the distinction between a sale and
the rendition of services is a highly artificial one.
' "4
After labeling the transaction "a hybrid partaking of in-
gredients of a sale and a service," 141 the court appropriately
commenced answering several relevant inquiries by recognizing
that the situation would necessarily produce one or more of
the described varieties of information impactedness:
A beauty parlor operator in soliciting patronage as-
sures the public that he or she possesses adequate
knowledge and skill . . . . When a patron responds to
the solicitation she does so confident that any product
used in the shop has come from a reliable origin and
can be trusted not to injure her. She places herself in
the hands of the operator relying upon his or her ex-
pertise both in the selection of the products to be used
on her and in the method of using them. . . . [T]he
patron is a mere passive recipient.'
42
The most likely source of information impactedness problems
in the beauty parlor service market is significant cue reliance,
causing a confounding of before and after the fact evaluation.
Therefore, one would expect to witness the limited deteriora-
139 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
' 411 Id. at 592, 258 A.2d at 700.
141 Id. at 593, 258 A.2d at 701.
142 Id. at 593-94, 258 A.2d at 701.
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tion and substantial opportunism characterizing cue-reliant
markets.
1 43
The quoted discussion of operator expertise, the court's
earlier comments concerning the labelling on the wave solu-
tion, and the questions the operator chose to consider, combine
to suggest that the court implicitly gave an affirmative response
to the second preliminary inquiry, the availability of a range of
alternate techniques. The court concluded that there are in-
deed a variety of techniques used by beauty parlors that may
have an impact upon the customer's ultimate satisfaction and
health. Newmark also manifests concern for the third prelimi-
nary inquiry, profit-maximizing behavior by service providers.
The court, noting that businesses generally operate to make
money, suggested that such operation may occasionally entail
utilization of superior information for personal profit. The
clues to this attitude appear later in the opinion where the court
discussed the differences between a "commercial enterprise"
and a profession, stressing that a commercial enterprise solicits
customers and "caters publicly not to a need but to a form of
aesthetic convenience or luxury .... -144 The New Jersey Su-
preme Court did not examine the fourth preliminary inquiry,
whether existing forces could inhibit opportunism and dete-
rioration in the specific service market-in this case, beauty par-
lors. Generally, however, it appears that although beauticians
are now licensed in many states, presumably placing some min-
imal floor on the skill and care that they possess, such inhibiting
forces are absent in the market.
The court summarized much of its detailed weighing of
the best rule for this market by noting that implied warranties
were never intended to be limited by the reach of Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, that such concepts had already
been extended to leasing and mass-produced new housing, and
that "the policy reasons for imposing warranty liability in the
case of ordinary sales are equally applicable to a commercial
transaction such as that existing in this case .. . In the terms
stressed here, the court invoked explicitly the concept of in-
dividual marketplace justice1 46 and recognized that substantial
1
4 3 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
144 54 N.J. at 596, 258 A.2d at 702.
' 45 Id. at 594-95, 258 A.2d at 701-02.
146 Id. at 592-93, 258 A.2d at 700 ("[D]efendants argue that if, in addition to rec-
ommending the use of a lotion or other product . . . they applied it, such fact (the
application) would have the effect of lessening their liability to the patron by eliminat-
ing warranty .... There is no just reason why it should.").
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transaction costs of enforcement favor some type of outcome-
oriented rule. 147 Certainly the basic policy reasons that the court
initially articulated for imposing implied warranties must in-
clude some notion of the permissible extent of marketplace
risks. 148 One may assume, therefore, that the court believed
that cold waves causing injuries to innocent customers are out-
side the proper boundary of allowable risks and consequently
subject to liability for resultant harm.
Although stating the inquiries in somewhat different
fashion, the Newmark court can be credited with having raised
or hinted at most of the considerations stressed by this Com-
ment as relevant to the choice of a legally implied guarantee.
Newmark also makes an attempt, reminiscent of that made in
Broyles, to define the outer boundaries of the new rule it pro-
poses for hybrid transactions. The court felt particularly com-
pelled to make this effort because of defendant's claim that the
situation was indistinguishable from Magrine v. Krasnica,'49 in
which the same court refused to hold a dentist liable when a
hypodermic needle broke off in a patient's jaw during an at-
tempted injection of a local anaesthetic. Both cases involved
defective products apparently causing injury to consumers in
the course of the performance of a service. Newmark outlines
many bases for distinguishing beauticians from dentists and
doctors, most derived from the central difference discussed
above between a "commercial enterprise" and a "profession."
The court pointed out that medical professionals, who cannot
advertise, provide services only upon the perceived need of the
patient, exercise their best judgment in difficult diagnostic
problems, and perform tasks that are not mechanical or rou-
tine.1511 In summarizing its attitude toward increased warranty
liability for medical service providers, the court concluded:
Neither medicine nor dentistry is an exact science;
there is no implied warranty of cure or relief. There is
no representation of infallibility and such professional
men should not be held to such a degree of perfec-
147 Id. at 595, 258 A.2d at 702 ("[Plractical administration suggests that the princi-
ple of liability be expressed in terms of strict liability in tort thus enabling it to be
applied in practice unconfined by the narrow conceptualism associated with the techni-
cal niceties of sales and implied warranties.").
148 See notes 69-71 supra & accompanying text.
94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 53 N.J.
259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
,50 54 N.J. at 596, 258 A.2d at 702-03.
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tion. . . . Practitioners of such callings . . . must be
deemed to have a special and essential role in our soci-
ety . . . . In our judgment, the nature of the services,
the utility of and the need for them, involving as they
do, the health and even survival of many people, are
so important to the general welfare as to outweigh in
the policy scale any need for the imposition on dentists
and doctors of the rules of strict liability in tort. 5 1
Thus Newmark goes well beyond Broyles' single-minded focus
on the uncertainty principle, suggesting as a preliminary matter
that professionals are inherently less exploitative than service
providers in commercial enterprises, and recognizing that many
professional tasks are marked by substantial uncertainties. Soci-
ety regards the particular services provided by these medical
professionals as so clearly within the range of desired market-
place alternatives that other policy considerations fail to justify
imposing any additional burdens through stricter implied guar-
antees that might limit the availability of such services.
The Newmark court thus exceeded the Broyles court in its
sensitivity to the relevant factors dictating rules for true profes-
sionals different from those applied to basic commercial service
providers. Newmark also eschews the pitfall of announcing a
single general criterion to provide the rule of decision for fu-
ture cases requiring some limit on the broad use of strict liability
concepts. The one Newmark step down an analytically empty
path is scattered language suggesting an important distinction
between "pure services" and hybrid cases in which consumers
purchase both product and service. 152 The court paused to re-
iterate that sale-like elements were involved: "Obviously in per-
manent wave operations the product is taken into consideration
in fixing the price of the service."' 53 Similarly, in reviewing
Magrine, the court recalled approvingly that it found the dentist
not subject to strict liability "because the essence of the relation-
ship with his patient was the furnishing of professional skill
and services. We accepted the view that a dentist's bill for ser-
vices should be considered as representing pay for that alone.
1 54
151 Id. at 596-97, 258 A.2d at 702-03.
152 Several of the commentators who analyzed Newmark at the time it was decided
(the comments were written after the Appellate Division opinion which the Supreme
Court here affirmed) also criticized this distinction between hybrids and so-called "pure
services." See 34 Mo. L. REv. 604, 611 (1969); 47 TEx. L. REV. 716, 722-23 (1969). But
see 71 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 216-18 (1969).
1-3 54 N.J. at 593, 258 A.2d at 701.
154 Id. at 596, 258 A.2d at 702.
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That the patient would not normally be viewed as "buying" the
dentist's hypodermic needle was somehow important in deter-
mining which legal rule should govern the transaction. The
Newmark court perceived this distinction to be of continuing
vitality: when elaborating on the differences between beauti-
cians and medical professionals, Justice Francis noted that
beauty parlors offer "the rendition of non-professional ser-
vices and the application of products for which a charge is
made, ' 155 but that medical service providers "are not producers
or sellers of property in any reasonably accepted sense of the
term. In a primary sense they furnish services in the form of an
opinion .... 156
Although the Newmark court cannot be faulted for limit-
ing its holding to the sale-service hybrid transaction it faced,
the suggestion that differentiating services in which a product is
part of the package from those which are "pure service" should
isolate situations meriting strict liability from those deserving
negligence rules is perhaps the court's one major analytic error.
After carefully sketching the more appropriate bases for deci-
sion in the rest of its opinion-the extent of the customer's re-
liance, the range of allowable and desired marketplace risks, the
costs of enforcement-the Newmark court should not have re-
sorted to artificial line drawing between pure services and
hybrids. The unfortunate consequences of this reasoning may
emerge subsequently when courts engage in such unrewarding
activities as comparing the relative prices of the sale and service
components to decide if the disputed transaction contains suf-
ficient aspects of a sale to avoid classification as a pure service. 157
Furthermore, the particular weaknesses of this distinction could
be most glaring if cases present situations of so-called pure ser-
vices that are not performed by licensed professionals, or that
the court views as less socially essential than medical efforts.
When circumstances require a court to announce a legal stan-
dard of implied guarantees for marriage counselors and jani-
torial services, the lines of inquiry herein urged but approx-
imated only in part by the Newmark court would provide the
clues necessary to uncover the most appropriate rule. Artificial
line drawing inherent in the pure service concept should be jet-
tisoned.
In addition to its other contributions, Newmark potentially
1
5 5 
Id.
'56 Id. at 597, 258 A.2d at 703.
157 Cf. Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 442-43, 481 P.2d 924,
926-27 (1971) (analogous weighing method employed in basic sale-service context).
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aids courts deciding which particular groups claiming to be pro-
fessionals guided by the "service ideal" are properly deserving
of that appellation 5 8 in setting the legal standard for their
service market. The court's stress on the current noncommer-
cialization of medicine and dentistry suggests that as self-pro-
claimed professionals begin to advertise and take other steps
to actively solicit customers rather than merely responding to
a "felt need," they increasingly resemble commercial enterprises
for which the standards of implied warranties are appropriate.
Service providers engaging in sizable commercial activities can
hardly claim that they are so far removed from a profit orienta-
tion in their dealings with individual clients and patients that
the type of predictions generated by these models of informa-
tion impacted markets are inapposite. This recognition of in-
creasingly profit-motivated decisions in the choice of treatment
or performance does not necessarily lead to imposing an implied
warranty upon such markets. It could, however, tip the balance
back by indicating that stricter, outcome-related rules could
have a positive effect on curbing deterioration and opportun-
ism because these "professional" service providers behave sub-
stantially like typical entrepreneurs in the management of their
affairs and the choice of production and marketing strate-
gies.'
59
IV. THE DECISIONAL FRAMEWORK REVISITED: ITS LIMITS
Two important final observations can be made about
the probable outcome of employing the decisional framework
suggested by this Comment. First, although this approach es-
sentially involves market-by-market, case-by-case determina-
tion of legal rules, many of the cases involving everyday con-
sumer services are likely to yield the same outcome. After
answering the preliminary inquiries which are basically de-
signed to warn of unusual circumstances, courts deciding these
"normal cases" involving barbers, movers, gardeners, television
repairmen, and comparable service providers, will proceed to
the balancing considerations. Because outcome-related rules of
the implied warranty type generally offer greater potential for
combating opportunism and deterioration, less prohibitive
transaction costs of enforcement, and markedly stronger in-
' " See notes 129-33 supra & accompanying text.
159 This decision admittedly may be a very difficult one for the courts to make. If
the group claiming that it merits treatment as a true profession is already subject to
extensive legislative regulation, the courts may react cautiously to avoid altering sud-
denly the rules in a way likely to reshape fundamentally an important market.
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centives for efficient behavior on the producer side, the implied
warranty rule will be favored typically for all these "normal ser-
vice" markets if the courts apply this analytical framework. t 60
The real value of this admittedly elaborate decision process,
therefore, is that in addition to heralding the proper extension
of implied warranty concepts to many service transactions, it
also provides a series of check points at which particular situa-
tions can be categorized as exceptional markets better served by
maintaining the more familiar negligence rule.
Finally, the series of market descriptions and the assess-
ment of the potential role of implied guarantee rules should
give warning that the other probable result of utilizing this de-
cisional framework will not be, unfortunately, the elimination
of all information impactedness-related problems from ser-
vice markets. Many particularly troublesome service markets,
such as the auto repair and home improvement markets, are
characterized by rampant opportunism, especially in the per-
formance of unnecessary and unnecessarily costly work.' 61 No
implied guarantee rule can effectively combat such opportun-
ism, with the possible exception of the imposition of some type
of drastic agency or fiduciary obligations on service providers,
obligations that would be fundamentally at odds with the basic
assumptions of our commercial system. 162 In short, beyond
helping judges arrive at better-reasoned decisions in cases re-
quiring a new implied guarantee standard for particular mar-
kets, this analysis should alert policy makers to the necessary
limits of such legal rules. Alternatives that do not necessarily
involve litigation and the courts, such as licensing, disclosure
rules, and official publication of comparative information, 1
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will have to be implemented along with appropriate implied
guarantees to alleviate effectively the problems caused by infor-
mation impactedness.
160 Two possible new frontiers for the extension of implied warranties are the in-
surance and computer programming service markets, See Comment, Liability for Defects
in Computer Software, 53 J. URB. L. 280 (1975) (computer programming); 9 AKRON L.
REV. 584 (1976) (insurance).
161 See note 2 supra & accompanying text.
162 Even the strictest fiduciary rules, such as making the service provider responsi-
ble for protecting the full range of his customer's interests, would not be very effective
unless they somehow alleviated magically the detection problem that always obscures
opportunism from the "victim." See note 61 supra & accompanying text. If customers
routinely sued for breach of duty, then the legal transaction costs would skyrocket, and
the courts would be left with a potentially impossible and wholly inappropriate adminis-
trative task of assessing the fairness of every challenged deal.
163 For an example of a proposal for a federal program of affirmative disclosure in
products markets, see Rhoades, Reducing Consumer Ignorance: An Approach and Its Effect,
20 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 309 (1975).
